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Abstract 
This thesis explores the opportunities available for provincial elites in 
Guangdong to shape local policies based on the two scales developed by Mackenzie 
and Page. Legal localism means that local political elites may significantly shape 
local policies by exercising the authorities prescribed in law, and political localism 
means that political elites may significantly shape local policies by influencing 
national decision making. It is found that the pattern of the central-provincial 
relations in China is based largely political localism, while Guangdong is undergoing 
the process towards greater legal localism. The momentum for Guangdong's moving 
towards local legalism is the robust development of local legislation, which people 
value and will strengthen. As many functions and discretion of government agencies 
are specified by law, the autonomy of Guangdong is institutionalized to a 
considerable degree. The paper argues that legal localism is a desirable pattem for 
central-local relations in China, considering the features that legal localism normally 
associates, such as high degree of institutionalization and local autonomy, pluralism, 
professionalism, and stable regime. If the trend continues, a central-Guangdong 
relationship based on legal localism will be a likely future, although its realization 
requires more profound reform of the central-local relations and citizens' apt 
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Politicians, Legislature, and Localism in Guangdong 
--Towards an institutionalized autonomy 
LI Jiehui 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The research question 
This thesis is about the opportunities for local political elites to shape local 
policies in Guangdong, China. Local government everywhere in the world provides a 
large proportion of public services, deals with citizens most directly, and thus 
significantly affects our society. The value of local government lies in its “being local." 
Being local allows people to participate in local affairs by responding to local issues and 
influencing the decisions of local government. Responsiveness and accountability, in 
many scholars' view, are the greatest strengths oflocal government. ^  For liberal 
theorists, local government is an important vehicle for the maximization of democracy. 
John Stuart Mill and de Tocqueville have viewed local government as a supreme 
democratic institution for training statesmen and educating the electorate to be active 
1 George Jones and John Stewart, The case for local government, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985; K. 
Young, "Thejustification oflocal government," Michael Goldsmith, Essays on the future of local 
government, Wakefield: West Yorks MCC., 1981, pp. 8-20. 
1 
participants in the system. Being an indispensable pillar of democracy, local 
2 
government shall be autonomous in its own right. 
This, however, contrasts with the reality that local government is a subordinate 
institution in the national political configuration. The structure and power of local 
government are therefore subject to the control ofhigher level of authorities, and can be 
changed by them. The justification for this is the view that local government is an 
efficient provider of public services, and is essentially a local branch ofthe nation-state 
administrative apparatus. In this regard, there is almost a "conventional wisdom" to 
reorganize local governments into bigger units and to put local government under more 
central control so as to achieve delivery efficiency.^ 
Thus local government has been inherently caught in an efficiency-democracy 
and subordination-autonomy dualism since its existence. On the one hand, local 
government is supposed to act according to the preferences established within the 
locality. On the other hand, this is predestined to be difficult because local government 
has to follow central instructions which give expression to national preferences. Under 
this situation, it will be interesting to know how autonomous local government is vis-a-
vis the national authorities. Clearly, the autonomy of local government relates directly 
to the opportunities available for local government to shape local policies. The more 
such opportunities are available, the more autonomous is local government. 
Thus, what are such opportunities? How can local political elites take these 
opportunities to determine local affairs and shape local public services? There have 
been studies of this kind for the developed countries in Europe and America, but 
2 Dilys M. Hill, Democratic theory and local government, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974, p. 17. 
3 R.A.W. Rhodes, Control and power in central-local relations, Hants: Gower, pp. 14-7. 
2 
systematic studies of such kind are not yet available in China, which is a very different 
regime from Western democracies. What is the situation in China? How is it different 
from those in the Westem democratic countries? 
This study attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the central-
Guangdong relations since 1978. In the past two decades, Guangdong officials have 
been apt to utilize or even “create” various opportunities for the development ofthe 
province. Guangdong witnessed rapid economic growth, while at the same time the 
province has been renown for its “localism.’，< An in-depth study of the province is 
therefore expected to shed light on our understanding of the above questions. 
1.2 The research method 
This thesis will base its exploration of the opportunities for local political elites 
to shape local policies upon two dimensions developed by Mackenzie and Page. 
1.2.1 The legal and political scales 
In his “Local government in parliament," Mackenzie distinguishes two scales, 
political and legal, to describe the varying degrees of integration between local 
government and central government.^ Based on Mackenzie's ideas, Page identifies two 
broad ways - legal and political - in which local elites can influence local policies. 
First, local political elites may exert their influence by exercising authorities provided by 
formal legal documents, for example, to raise local revenue and decide how and where 
the money is spent. The opportunities available for local political elites who employ this 
4 David S.G. Goodman and Feng Chongyi, "Guangdong: greater Hong Kong and the new regionalist 
future," David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China deconstructs: politics, trade and 
regionalism, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 177-201. 
5 W.J.M. Mackenzie, "Local government in parliament," Public administration, vol. 32, 1954, pp. 409-23. 
3 
means can be assessed on a legal scale, which measures the scope for action by the local 
authorities at its discretion to run or shape public services.^ 
Second, local political elites may influence public policy by "using their political 
authority as democratically legitimate representatives of the locality, or a significant 
section of its population, to influence national decisions in so far as they affect the 
locality.，，7 Examples of this include getting special legislation for a public work project, 
acquiring permission to borrow money, and so and so. As a general rule, the more local 
interests are represented in the center, the more opportunities local politicians will have. 
The opportunities for making this kind of influence may be assessed on a political scale, 
which measures the extent to which local interests are represented at the national level. 
Mackenzie, for example, counts the number ofMembers ofParliament who have local 
experience to see whether local government is adequately represented at the central 
level.8 
“Localism” in this paper means the presence of opportunities for local political 
elites to shape local policies, while centralism means the absence of such opportunities.^ 
Thus, the opportunity structure in a regime's central-local arrangements may be 
characterized based on the presence or absence of either the political opportunities or 
legal opportunities (Figure 1). Along the legal scale, Page argues that the arrangements 
of central-local relations in Britain represent typical legal localism, which means that 
substantial authorities prescribed in law have offered local elites rich opportunities to 
6 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 6. 
7 Ibid., p. 5. 
8 W.J.M. Mackenzie, “Local government in parliament." 
9 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 6. 
4 
shape local affairs. In contrast, France, Italy, and Spain are regarded as exemplary cases 
of political localism, which is characterized by the availability of opportunities for local 
political elites to shape local policies through influencing the decision making at the 
national level. Interesting enough, political localism coincides with legal centralism, 
and legal localism coincides with political centralism in the seven countries Page has 
1 A 
Studied. 
Figure 1 Patterns of opportunity structure 
YES NO  
(opportunities available) (opportunities absent) 
The legal opportunity: can 
local elites determine local Legal localism Legal centralism 
policies by exercising the 
authorities specified in law? 
The political opportunity: can 
local elites determine local Political localism Political centralism 
policies by influencing 
national decision making? 
1.2.2 The adaptation of Page，s method in China 
Although Page and Mackenzie's methodology was developed in the Westem 
context, it may be satisfactorily adapted to the conditions in China. Localism exists in 
any regime in the world, occidental or oriental, capitalist or communist. The idea of 
examining localism on two dimensions — legal and political - does not limit its 
application to the Western regimes. For all the regimes where localism exists and where 
there are legal and political activities, such idea may be adopted for investigation and 
study. 
10 Ibid, Chapters 2 and 3. 
5 
This is not to say that specific conditions in some countries may be neglected. In 
China, for example, laws and many legal institutions are still in the development stage, 
and the provincial leaders are to a large extent appointed by the center rather than 
elected democratically by local people. Local political elites in China, therefore, mean 
that they have the status, role, responsibility, work pressure and incentive structure that 
are associated with the posts of a territorial hierarchy. In contrast, local political elites in 
the Western context may mean that they are elected, appointed, or even brought up and 
educated in a particular locality, and are usually answerable to their constituency. 
Despite all this, the framework developed by Mackenzie and Page is adaptable to fit in 
different situation and make sense. Details of the adaptation will be addressed in the 
specific parts concerned. 
1.2.3 The utilities of the two scales 
There are a number of merits for this study to adopt the two-scale framework 
among other possible ones. First, the two scales help us to break the complex central-
local relations into two clear and easy-to-measure dimensions without using such vague 
terms as centralization and decentralization. Second, although central-local relations are 
more than these two dimensions, they have nevertheless included major government 
activities and therefore we do not miss any important elements for this kind of study. 
The clientelistic/patronage model in studying central-local relations,^ for example, can 
be well incorporated into the political dimension of the subject. Surely the two scales do 
not say everything about central-local relations, and not as much as those studies that 
11 Michael Goldsmith, "Local autonomy: theory and practice," Desmond S. King and Jon Pierre (eds.), 
Challenges to local government, London: Sage, 1990, pp. 15-36. 
6 
employ tens of variables do�^ However, they are able to make "valid distinctions which 
can then be used to highlight issues and processes which would not be possible, or at 
least would be far more difficult, using concepts at a lower level ofabstraction."'^ 
Third and most importantly, the two scales are themselves meaningful in 
accounting the development of central-local relations. As will be shown later, a major 
defect of central-local relations in China is the lack of institutionalization. Assumably 
the more the opportunities for local political elites to shape local policies are offered by 
law, the more institutionalized will be the central-local relations. It will be of great 
interest to know, therefore, whether or not the legal opportunities provided by law 
increase in the past two decades. 
Lastly, a comparison of the central-local relations in different countries based on 
these two scales may yield other interesting findings. Mackenzie has found that the 
integration between the local government and central government on the legal scale may 
not correspond to that on the political scale.^^ Page goes further to investigate the 
consequences of different patterns of localism, and finds that political localism enhances 
politicians' power vis-a-vis professional a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ” Although this is out of the 
scope of this study, these two scales and the data concerned may provide a tool and 
materials for further research. 
12 For example, in his Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: the sub-central governments of Britain 
(London: Hyman Unwin, 1988), R.A.W. Rhodes uses over thirty variables to depict the development of 
central-local relations in Britain. 
13 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 11. 
14 W.J.M. Mackenzie, "Local government in parliament," pp. 42-3. 
15 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 69-96. 
7 
1.3 The research plan 
This study will assess the opportunities available for local political elites to shape 
local policies in China with focus on Guangdong province. 
The rest of the paper will be divided into seven chapters. The next chapter will 
give an overall picture of the central-local relations in China since 1949 and basic 
information concerning Guangdong to serve as the background and context for our 
investigation into the central-Guangdong relations. The legal arrangement will then be 
analyzed and assessed in Chapters 3 and 4, followed by the assessment of the political 
arrangement in Chapters 5 and 6. For a better understanding of the central-Guangdong 
relations, major characters of the legal and political arrangements of central-provincial 
relations in China will first be discussed respectively in Chapters 3 and 5 to reveal the 
opportunities which Guangdong, as well as other provinces, may employ to shape local 
policies. Then Chapters 4 and 6 will focus on the changes of such opportunities in 
Guangdong and some effects of these changes in Guangdong. After evaluating the 
characters and changes of the legal and political arrangements of central-Guangdong 
relations in China, Chapter 7 will look further into the connection between political and 
legal localism, the reasons for the changes in the political and legal arrangements, and 
the implications of these changes on institutionalization. The potential course towards a 
central-local relationship based on legal localism, which is considered desirable, will be 
also discussed. The final chapter is to sum up major findings of this study and offer 
some suggestions for further studies. 
The data for this research came from two kinds of sources. One was those 
published materials in books, articles, newspaper and government documents. As data 
8 
from this source might not be able to answer some specific questions, interviews were 
also conducted so as to get necessary insights about the research questions and 
supplement the published materials. 
We now turn to the background of central-local relations in China. 
9 
Chapter 2 Central-local relations in China: an overview 
This chapter is to give an overall picture of the central-local relations in China 
since 1949 as the background and context for our investigation into the central-
Guangdong relations. Over the past few decades the design and practice of central-local 
governmental relationship has undergone rounds of changes in either the developed or 
developing world. "Few government reforms," a scholar notes, ‘‘have been as 
widespread as the reforms at the sub-national level."^^ China is no exception to this rule, 
despite many of its unique characters. 
2.1 Major reforms in central-local relations 
As early as in 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic, 
China began to build up a Soviet-type command economy. Under such a system, almost 
every area of economic activities, such as economic plan, resource distribution, trade, 
price and labor management, became subjects of central control, and local governments 
were but the extension of the central government. In this period, even an acquisition of 
1 n 
fixed property of one hundred Yuban required approval from Beijing. During two 
rounds of decentralization in the periods from 1957 tol958 and from the late 1960s to 
the 1970s, local governments assumed some functions of economic management, but 
economic disorder was subsequently produced, and then came other forms of 
recentralization. The economy was rarely attended by people in this period, as local 
16 Bruno Dente and Francesco Kjellberg, "Introduction," Bruno Dente and Francesco Kjellberg (eds.) The 
dynamics of institutional change: local government reorganization in Western democracies, London: 
Sage, 1988，p. 1. 
10 
governments and enterprises were concerned more about politics than economy due to 
• • • 18 
the highly politicized atmosphere accumulated in rounds of political campaign. As a 
result, once the economy was centralized, the economy became "dead"; once 
decentralized, the economy became uncontrollable {yi shou jiu si, yifangjiu luan). 
From 1978 on China saw a comprehensive reform aimed at “socialist 
modernization."^^ While the central theme of the reform, that is, to improve the force of 
production, was largely in economic terms, the building up of socialist democracy and 
legality was also put onto agenda. The core of the reform was a set of decentralization 
policies, not only economically, but also politically. 
Briefly speaking, the economic measures included, among other things, a fiscal 
20 • 
contract system {caizheng baogan) under which the provincial governments might 
retain a portion of local financial income at their disposal. Provincial governments also 
obtained various authorities of economic management, such as to approve investment 
projects within a specific amount. These policies were to give provincial governments 
and enterprises more incentives to foster local economies. In the political arena, the 
center granted law-making power to the provincial-level people's congresses, and 
introduced a new election method which allowed more candidates than the seats to be 
17 Zhou Taihe (ed.), Dangdai zhongguo de jingji gaige {Economic reform in contemporary China), 
Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Press, 1984, p. 84. 
18 For details, refer to Zhao Suisheng, "China's central-local relationship: a historical perspective," Jia 
Hao and Lin Zhimin (eds.), Changing central-local relations in China: reform and state capacity, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 19-34; Ma Hong et.al. (eds.) Zhongguo gaige quanshu (A 
comprehensive book of reform in China), vol. 1, DaLian: Dalian Press, 1992, pp. 3-78; and Fang 
Weizhong, Zhonghua renmin gonghegiio jingji dashiji 1949-1980 {MaJor economic events ofthe 
People's Republic ofChina 1949-1980), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Press, 1984. 
i9Wang Hongmo et.al., Gaige kaifang de licheng {The process of reform and openness), Zhengzhou: 
Henan Renmin Press, 1989，pp. 130-5. 
2�In this paper "provinces" include provinces (sheng), autonomous regions {zizhiqu), and municipals under 
direct central control {zhixiashi), and "provincial governments" include the governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities under direct central control. 
11 
^ 1 
filled {cha e xuanjii). Furthermore, substantial authorities over cadre management 
were devolved to lower levels since the mid 1980s so that local governments could 
^ ^ 
control the personnel directly below them. Clearly, these measures not only benefited 
local governments, but also helped delegate power into more units. For one thing, the 
bitter experiences of the political campaigns, especially the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, had told reformers that it was highly dangerous if power was concentrated 
in a few people's hands.^^ 
The reform years witnessed a high speed of economic growth. The gross 
domestic products increased from RMB 362.4 billion Yuban in 1978 to 5,773 billion 
Yuban in 1995, or nearly five times of the 1978 value in real term.^^ The side effects 
accumulated during the years were also apparent, however. Provinces were competing 
with each other for favorable policies and resources. Economic resources were in effect 
compartmentalized, which gave rise to "regionalism."^^ Serious economic crime and 
corruption persisted, and the soaring inflation led to popular disaffection and, indirectly, 
the Tian'anmen Crisis in 1989.26 Under such circumstances, the State Council launched 
an all-round retrenchment policy characterized by restriction and recentralization in late 
71 
“Refer to the Organic Law of Local People 's Congresses and Local People ’s Governments and the 
Electoral Law of Local People 's Congresses and Local People 's Government enacted by NPC, 1979. 
22 Wu Guoguang, "Zhongyang yu difang fenquan de tedian, qushi, yu zhengzhi yingxiang (The characters, 
trends, and political implications of the division of power between the central and local governments)," 
Wu Guoguang and Zheng Yongnian, Lun zhongyang-difang guawci: zhongguo zhidu zhuanxing zhong de 
yige zhouxin wenti (On the central-local relationship: a core problem of institutional transition in China), 
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 165-98; John P. Burns, "China's nomenklatura system," 
Problems of communism, vol. 36, Sep./Oct. 1987, pp. 36-51. 
2 � e e ’ for example, Deng Xiaoping, DengXiaoping Wenxuan 1975-1982 (A collection ofDengXiaoping's 
works 1975-1982), Beijing: Renmin Press, 1983, pp. 280-302. 
24pRC Year Book 1996/97, pp. 427-8. 
"^See Maria Hsia Chang, "China's future: regionalism, federation, or disintegration," Studies in 
comparative communism, vol. 25, no. 3, September 1992, pp. 211-27; Xin Xiangyang, Daguo zhuhou: 
zhongguo zhongyangyu difang guawci zhijie (Dukedom in a big country: the knot of central-local 
relations in China), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Press, 1995. 
12 
1988. It was not until 1992，when state patriarch Deng Xiaoping toured to the South, 
that the Central Government loosened its control over the economy. But soon came 
another round of economic overheating, followed by yet another round ofretrenchment 
aimed at “soft landing." Clearly, up to the early 1990s, the central-local relations in 
China were not yet stabilized. The centralization-decentralization- recentralization 
pattem of Chinese reform had not escaped the vicious cycle of yi tong jiu si, yifangjiu 
luan (once centralized, the economy becomes lifeless; once decentralized, the economy 
becomes uncontrollable). 
2.2 Provinces under the economic cycle 
It was probably the provinces that felt the strongest effect ofthe cycle of 
centralization and decentralization. During the decentralization period, provinces were 
encouraged to take faster and bigger steps to boost local economy, while during the 
centralization period not only many projects had to be suspended or canceled, but many 
27 
authorities and favorable policies might be taken back by the Central Government. 
After years of reform, however, provincial governments have acquired a considerable 
amount of economic and political resources, and embodied more and more local 
interests. Provinces tend to maximize their autonomy, achieve faster rates of economic 
growth, and retain as much financial income as possible. As Harding notes it, what is 
26 The soaring price had almost triggered a social unrest early in 1988, see Lowell Dittmer, "China in 
1988: the continuing dilemma of socialist reform," Asia survey, vol. 29, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 12-28. 
27See, for example, Henny Sender, "Pulling the welcome mat: Beijing gets tough on foreign investment in 
power," Far eastern economic review, vol. 157, Apr. 14 1994, pp. 74-5; Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfii 
de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu {Autonomous behavior ofthe provincial 
government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open era), M.Phil. Thesis, Department of 
Government and Public Administration, The Chinese University ofHong Kong, 1990, pp. 51-4. 
13 
“unique to the post-Mao era is the growing ability of the provinces to pursue these 
interests.”28 
2.3 The case of Guangdong 
29 
Generally speaking, Guangdong is a province with strong local identity. Partly 
because ofthis, and given it was situated in the “front area" of potential warfare between 
China and the capitalist world, Guangdong received little investment and preferential 
treatment from Beijing in the first three decades after 1949. As a result, the growth of 
agriculture and industry in the province lagged behind the average performance ofthe 
nation.30 Since 1978, however, the province had been granted favorable policies from 
Beijing. The province has achieved tremendous economic success, and its average 
annual growth rate in terms of GDP reached 14.4 percent during the period from 1979 to 
1996.31 (See also Table 1). Today Guangdong is the biggest economy among the 
32 
provincial-level units in China. 
28Harry Harding, “‘On the four great relations': the prospects for China," Survival, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 
1994, pp. 22-42. 
29 For more details about the local identities and socio-economical features of Guangdong, see David S.G. 
Goodman and Feng Chongyi, "Guangdong: greater Hong Kong and the new regionalist future"; Peter T.Y. 
Cheung, "Relations between the central government and Guangdong," Y.M. Yeung and David K.Y. Chu 
(eds.), Guangdong: survey of a province undergoing rapid change. Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 1994, pp. 19-51. 
30 The average growth rate of GDP in Guangdong from 1953 to 1978 was 5.1 percent per annum, 1 
percent lower than the national average; the average annual growth rate of industry in Guangdong from 
1966 to 1975 was 9.7 percent, vs. the national 10.7 percent; of agriculture, Guangdong was 2.6 percent, 
vs. the national 4.0 percent. Data from David S.G. Goodman and Feng Chongyi, "Guangdong: greater 
Hong Kong and the new regionalist future," pp. 182-3; and Peter T.Y. Cheung, "Realigns between the 
central government and Guangdong," p. 22. 
31 Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong 1997, p. 73. 
32 In 1996, the GDP, value added ofthe tertiary sector, fixed asset investment, basic construction 
investment, retail ofconsumer goods, custom export, and government revenue in Guangdong were the 
greatest among those in the provincial-level units. Guangdong yearbook 1997, p. 620. 
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Table 1 GDP ofGuangdong, 1978-1996 
Year GDP Index  
(current price in billion RMB) (the above year as 100) 
1978 18.585 101.0 
1979 20.934 108.5 
1980 24.965 116.6 
1981 29.036 109.0 
1982 33.992 112.0 
1983 36.875 107.3 
1984 45.874 115.6 
1985 57.738 118.0 
1986 66.753 112.7 
1987 84.669 119.6 
1988 115.537 115.8 
1989 138.139 107.2 
1990 155.903 111.6 
1991 189.330 117.7 
1992 244.754 122.1 
1993 343.186 122.3 
1994 451.663 119.1 
1995 573.397 114.9 
^ 651.914 n ^  
Source: Guangdong Statistical Bureau, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1997, Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji 
Press, 1997，pp. 90-2. 
With its economic basis and the support from the central leadership, the 
provincial Government of Guangdong exercised great autonomy over its internal affairs, 
particularly in the period before 1989. Since then, however, Beijing decided to give 
Shanghai higher strategic priority in China's reform, and the most favorable policies 
have gone to Shanghai instead of Guangdong.^^ Thus Guangdong has undergone a 
"political cycle" in terms of central patronage. It will be interesting to see how 
Guangdong responded to such changes, and whether there were any changes in the 
Province's autonomy in extent and in character. 
^^See, for example, Elizabeth Cheng, "Now it's bund aid," Far eastern economic review, vol. 147, no. 11, 
15 March 1990, pp. 38-9. 
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Chapter 3 Legal assessment I: China 
This chapter measures the opportunities available for political elites in the 
provinces to shape local policies on the legal scale. According to Page, the legal scale 
measures the functions performed by local governments and the discretion a local 
government has to perform these functions.^^ Such functions and discretion ofthe local 
government are not necessarily prescribed by law, but by formal legal documents.^^ 
What may be counted as formal legal documents in China differs from that in 
Western democracies. All the laws, government documents and Party documents 
promulgated by either the central or local authorities, including the legislature, 
government and Party Committee, offer local government opportunities to determine 
local policies in one way or other. It is impossible to list all the provisions in these 
documents, given the huge number of them^^ and the fact that many of them may not be 
accessible at all. Nevertheless some categories of them may be discerned in terms ofthe 
opportunities they offer for localities. 
In the following parts the general legal framework concerning the constitutional 
status of local government in China will first be discussed, which will be followed by a 
survey of different types of legal documents to see what opportunities they offer local 
government. The final section is an overall assessment of the opportunities for local 
authorities to determine local affairs on the legal scale. 
34 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 6. 
35 Ibid., p. 6. 
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3.1 The general legal framework 
3.1.1 Omni-competence 
The status of local government varies in different constitutional systems. In 
some countries local governments are assumed to be omni-competent, and they are 
given the statutory right to undertake what theyjudge is the best for their areas unless it 
is otherwise specified by law. On the other hand, the ultra virus principle in Britain 
rules that local government must obtain statutory confirmation to undertake each of its 
services. 
Today most constitutional systems assume that an areal government has omni-
competence over local administration, but there is restriction in varying degrees attached 
to it. In France, the communal government may decide on all matters of local interest, 
but no actions incurring loans or interfering market competition shall be undertaken 
o^  ^^  
without explicit state authorization. There are fewer conditions attached to the 
competence of local government in the Scandinavian countries. Sweden, for example, 
has a tradition of limiting omni-competence only by specifying that the “ ‘local interest' 
^ o 
activities should be consistent with ‘good order and economy'." 
As in all the unitary states, local govemment^^ in China is subordinate to the 
central government, and all the authorities of local government are derived ultimately 
from Beijing. According to the Constitution and Organic Law for Local Government 
and Local People ’s Congress (Local Organic Law hereafter), local government in China 
36 Page has noted that this will be a long, tedious, and possibly fruitless exercise. See Edward C. Page, 
Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-government, p. 14. 
37 Code Municipal, Chapter 3, cited in ibid., p. 23. 
38 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, pp. 38-9. 
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is assumed to have omni-competence: the local people's congress is entitled to make 
decisions concerning local political, economic, cultural, educational affairs, etc.，and a 
local government at or above the county level has the responsibility of administering 
local affairs according to law.^' In addition, provincial-level people's congress may 
enact laws that are not in conflict with the national laws and administrative regulations 
to be applied within the jurisdiction.^^ 
3.1.2 Dual subordination 
However, the omni-competence of local government is subject to strict central 
control. The foremost function of the local people's congress at or above the county 
level is to guarantee that the Constitution, laws, policies, regulations, orders, and 
decisions of the higher level ofPeople's Congresses are followed and i m p l e m e n t e d , 
and the foremost function of the local government is to carry out the decisions of the 
People's Congress at the same level and the directives of the government at the higher 
level.44 Also, neither local legislation, decisions, nor policies can be incongment with 
national laws or central administrative regulations. 
A two-dimension framework to compare different systems of local government 
developed by Humes IV may reveal the high degree of centralization in the Chinese 
local government system. The first dimension is the nature of control over local 
government, which varies from one extreme that based on subordination (intra-
organizational) to the other that based on regulation (inter-organizational). The second 
39 Here local government in China includes local people's congress (the legislature), local people's 
government (the executive branch) and the local Party committee. Local government in China may also 
mean the executive branch only, especially when it is listed beside the Party committee and legislature. 
40 Local Organic Law 1982, Article 7 Paragraph 3; . 
41 PRC Constitution 1982, Article 107. 
42 Ibid., Article 6. 
43 Ibid., Article 7 Paragraph 1. 
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is the extent to which such control is ‘‘focused in a single agency or spread among many 
functional or specialized hierarchies." The system is considered "areal" if a general 
ministry/agency for coordinating local affairs has a strong role vis-a-vis functional 
ministries. On the other hand, the system is termed "functional" if the coordination 
function lies in functional agencies. A situation in between is that both the general 
agency and functional agencies assume responsibilities for local affairs, and the system 
ofthis kind is termed "dual."^^ (Figure 2) 
In the terminology of Humes IV, the Chinese local government system is 
characterized by "dual subordination," which matches the Chinese term shuangcong 
lingdao. ^^ The feature of this system is that each level of local government and its 
agencies are accountable to an areal authority - formally local people's congress, and in 
reality local people's government and Party committee - and they are at the same time 
part of the central hierarchy and wholly subordinate to the respective central authorities. 
Therefore, each of the provincial agencies is subject to two sets of directives, one 
vertically through a functional command chain from the ministry in Beijing {tiao tiao), 
and the other horizontally from the provincial people's government (kuai kuai). The 
dual subordination system contrasts greatly with other systems. The British system 
offers an extreme example, in which the White Hall controls local government mainly 
by means of particular legislation, and there is no specific central agency responsible for 
controlling or coordinating local government affairs. 
44 Local Organic Law 1979, Article 35 Paragraph 1. 
45 Samuel Humes IV, Local governance and national power: a worldwide comparison oftradition and 
change in local government. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 4-5. 
46 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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Figure 2 Classification of local government systems by Humes IV 
Areal Dual Functional 
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Source: Samuel Humes IV, Local governance and national power, p. 5. 
2.1.3 The role of the Party 
According to the Chinese Constitution, China is a communist state led by the 
Party.47 Given the complex local government system in China, it is the one party system 
that provides the integrating mechanism for this complex and potentially difficult 
arrangement. Mackenzie has noticed for long that, in the Soviet-type countries 
including China, the state is overridden by the Party, and all major decisions are made 
within the inner circle of the Party instead of the govemment.^^ Once a decision is 
47 PRC Constitution, Introduction. 
48 WJ.M. Mackenzie, "Local government in parliament." For a brief introduction about how the Party 
took over the functions of the government in China, see Xie Qingkui et.al. (eds.), Dangdai Zhongguo 
Zhengfu (The contemporary government of the People 's Republic of China), Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin 
Press, 1991,pp. 44-7. 
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made, it is carried out through a command train on the basis of the Party's highly 
centralized structure, 
3.2 Legal documents and opportunities 
3.2.1 National laws 
Since China is a unitary state, all the authorities local government has are granted 
by the central government. Enacted by the central legislature, national laws often 
specify functions, authorities, and responsibilities concerning local administration, and 
may be regarded as a most formal source of power for local government. The 
Constitution and Local Organic Law define the authorities of central and local 
governments in general terms, which have been discussed in the preceding session. This 
session will concentrate on the specific laws {zhuanmen fd), such as the Forest Law and 
Education Law, which are enacted by the National People's Congress fNPC) and its 
Standing Committee fNPCSC) to govern specific areas or functions.^^ Most of the 
provisions in this type of law prescribe some mandatory functions for local government 
and its agencies, and the corresponding discretion associated with these functions. 
Nevertheless local executive has to follow the provisions prescribed in the law, which 
provides very little discretion for local government. 
The Education Law (1993), for example, specifies that primary and secondary 
education is administered by local government under the guidance of the State Council, 
and the higher education is administered by the State Council and provincial-level 
49 The democratic centralism in the Party means a high degree of centralism based on democracy. See The 
constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP Constitution hereafter), Introduction part. 
50 PRC Constitution, Articles 61 and 67. 
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govemments.5i Local government and education departments must follow these rules 
specified in the law and other regulations or documents by the State Council or 
Education Ministry (formerly the State Education Commission). The only explicit 
provision oflocal discretion is that whether to collect sub-charge for education or not 
and its amount may be decided by the provincial-level government.^^ 
Clearly, the discretion for local authorities offered by the specific laws is rather 
limited, and Guangdong authorities enjoy no privilege in this area. Many national laws 
have specified that local authorities must follow the regulations and instructions by the 
higher level ofgovemments, which reveal more details of the central-local arrangement. 
3.2.2 Administrative regulations 
The administrative regulations are considered as law in the broad sense in China. 
They may be promulgated by the State Council^^ and governments ofthe provinces and 
some big cities.^^ These regulations outnumber laws, and reveal more details of 
government in action. In the period from 1979 through 1991, the State Council 
promulgated 597 pieces of regulations, while the NPC and NPCSC enacted only 104 
laws.55 In the legislation for the custom administration, there was only one law 
promulgated by the national legislature, 14 regulations by the State Council, and 427 
administrative rules by the Custom itself.^^ 
51 PRC Education Law (enacted by NPCSC in 1995), Article 14. 
52 Ibid., Article 57. 
53 PRC Constitution, Articles 89. 
54 Local Organic Law (amended in 1995), Article 60. 
55 Liu Xingyi, "Zhongyang yu difang de lifa quan huafen (The division oflegislative power between the 
center and localities)," Wei Liqun, et. al. (eds.), Shichang jingji zhong de zhongyangyu difangjingji 
guanxi {Central-local economic relations in the market economy), Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Press, 1994, 
pp. 136-45. The same pattem is broadly followed at the local level. 
56 Renmin Ribao, 9 April 1989. See also Quan Zhiping and Jiang Zuozhong, Lun difangjingji liyi (On 
local economic interests), Guangzhou: Guangdong Sheng Renmin Press, 1992, pp. 153-9. 
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Many administrative regulations, particularly those concerning technical matters 
and those must be highly unified within the nation, such as civil aviation and 
telecommunication, have specified details of definition and operation. The Regulation 
ofPig Butchery promulgated by the State Council. It rules that butchering pigs must be 
done in registered sites (dingdian tuzaichang), which must meet seven conditions.^^ The 
definition of the product of pigs, which includes body, pork, fat, etc. is impossible to be 
changed.58 For this technical matters, there is almost no room for local government to 
exert its influence. 
Local government has more discretion in the administration of"ordinary" affairs 
such as education and public security. Because these affairs need to be dealt with in 
almost every localities throughout the nation, usually the central authorities have 
promulgated administrative regulations, and possibly national laws, to govem these 
affairs. There may be local regulations concerning these affairs too because they are 
also important to the locality. For these affairs, normally the central documents will lay 
down general principles and measures, which are in turn consolidated and carried out by 
local government. In the central documents there may be such wordings as "each 
province, municipality under direct central leadership, and autonomous region may 
promulgate detailed regulations accordingly," giving local government a limited degree 
of discretion. In regard to the road administration in Guangdong, for example, there are 
at the central level a PRC Road Law, and an Regulation of the Charge and 
Administration of the Road Maintenance Fee jointly promulgated by several ministries. 
Accordingly, Guangdong government promulgated a number of regulations, such as the 
57 Regulations concerning the administration of pig butchery (1997), Articles 2 and 7. 
58 Ibid., Article 22. 
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Regulation concerning Road Fee Charge and Management.^^ In most cases local 
regulations only supplement the central directives. Nevertheless the central regulations 
or documents have oftentimes been precise enough for operation, leaving limited room 
for local discretion. For instance, the Regulation for the implementation ofthe PRC land 
administration law promulgated by the State Council rules that the penalty for illegal use 
of land shall not exceed RMB 15 Yuban per square meter.^^ 
3.2.3 Government/Party documents 
An examination of government documents offers more insights into the functions 
and discretion oflocal government. Government documents may be issued by 
government and its agencies at every level. Some documents are issuedjointly by the 
Party Committee and government, and thus enjoy higher status than those issued by a 
government agency. 
As a source of power, there are no significant differences between government 
documents and administrative regulations. A circular {tongzhi) of the government may 
in effect change the provisions of regulations or other decisions previously made by the 
59 Guangdong sheng gonglu fei zhengshou guanli shishi xize {Detailed regulations concerning the charge 
and administration of the road toll ofGuangdong), promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial 
Government, 30 December 1997, Article 1. 
60 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tudi guanlifa shishi tiaoli {Regulations for the implementation ofthe PRC 
land administration law), promulgated by the State Council on 4 January 1991, Article 30. On the other 
hand, if the implementation of central policies undermines local interests significantly, local authorities 
may still make room for "adjustment" of the policies in one way or other. After all, central policies 
depend on local government to carry out. Unless the center is really determined to take whatever serious 
measures to have its policies observed, there is always some leeway for local government in 
implementation. For example, the State Council announced in December 1993 a capital gains tax with a 
maximum rate of200 percent on real estate markets. However, a Guangzhou official reacted by saying 
that the application of central laws must take local conditions into consideration, and for the time being no 
extra tax burden should be loaded on investors. This is a common practice of"playing marginal ball {ca 
bian qiuy, in Guangdong. Simply speaking, while Beijing sets the rules of the game, it is Guangdong to 
judge whether an action is foul or not unless Beijing intervenes. See Daniel Kwan, "Guangdong adapts 
central laws to local realities," South China Morning Post, 12 February, 1994. See also Yang Xiaohui, 
Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu {Autonomous behavior ofthe 
provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open era) for a scale ofmeasures the 
center may employ to enforce its authorities over local governments. 
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sanie government or those under it. For example, the State Council issued a notice in 
early 1998 to terminate all the direct-selling business in China, regardless that the setting 
up of this business was approved by the governments throughout the country following 
appropriate procedures prescribed in the laws and administrative regulations.^' 
The scope of activities government documents deal with is very wide. Several 
documents are essential for understanding the central-Guangdong relations since 1979. 
At the beginning of the reform, provinces had been used to following central directives 
closely, without daring to try what was not explicitly mentioned by Beijing. The Central 
Document [1979] No. 50 showed a green light to provincial initiatives by formally 
granting the special policies to Guangdong and Fujian. Several documents continued to 
give more autonomy to Guangdong (Table 2). By 1989 Guangdong had accumulated 
tremendous autonomy and become well known for its localism. 
Table 2 Major Party documents concerning Guangdong 
Document code Date of Issuing organ Main contents 
issuing  
Central doc. 15 July CCPCC, Granted the special policies and flexible 
[1979] no. 50 1979 State Council measures to Guangdong and Fujian 
Central doc. 16 May CCPCC, Consolidated the special policies and called for 
[1980] no. 41 1980 State Council cooperation of central ministries 
Central doc. 19 July CCPCC, Consolidated the reform initiative and confirm 
[1981] no. 27 1981 State Council the role o f t he SEZ 
State Council 25 Jan. State Council Continued the special policies and flexible 
doc. [1985] no. 1985 measures initiated in 1979; gave more favorable 
46 terms to the two provinces 
State Council cor. 10 Feb. State Council Approved "in principle" the demand of authority 
[1988] no. 25 1988 in ten areas by Guangdong 
61 People's Daily, 22 April 1998. 
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Some documents of Guangdong province exhibit that local authorities may have 
a high degree of discretion over “pure,，local affairs. An example is the migration policy 
for the construction of reservoirs in Guangdong. The policy originated from a motion of 
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress (PPC) in 1992, and will remain effective for at 
least ten years. By December 1997 the policy has cost RMB 508 million Yuban, and its 
related projects included 5170 kilometers of road, 2030 bridges, and many others. Such 
a huge project, however, is almost completely initiated and implemented within 
• • • 62 
Guangdong without signs of interference from Beijing. 
As a whole, except for those “pure” indigenous activities whose influence is 
completely confined within the province, local authorities have to follow laws and strict 
central guidance to run local government and handle local affairs without much 
discretion. As a scholar notes it, if the function of administering public affairs is shared 
by the central and local governments/agencies {fenji guanli), it is on the condition that 
• 63 
the centralized leadership (jizhong lingdao) is guaranteed. 
Worthy of pointing out, government/Party documents have significant difference 
from the laws and regulations promulgated by the legislature and government. The 
government/party documents do not have formal legal status, and many ofthem are only 
concerned about discrete matters. While collectively such documents provide an image 
of the distribution of power between the central and local authorities, individually these 
documents reflect more political decisions than "legal" practice. Therefore, details of 
62 For more details, see Guangdong government document [1997] no. 106, "zhuanfa guangdong sheng 
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyujixu shishijiejue shuiku yimin yiliu wenti yi'an de 
jueyi de tongzhi (A notice of delivering the decision by the Guangdong People's Congress Standing 
Committee concerning continuing implementation of the motion of dissolving the remaining problems of 
reservoir migration," Guangdong Zhengbao {Guangdong government gazette), no. 2 1998, pp. 44-60. 
63 Xie Qingkui et.al. (eds.), Dangdai zhongguo zhengfu (The contemporary government ofthe People 's 
Republic ofChind), Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Press, 1991, pp. 375-8. 
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these individual documents concerning central-Guangdong relations will be discussed in 
the chapter of political scale. 
3.2.4 Local legislation 
Local legislation has been becoming an important source of power for local 
government. According to the Local Organic Law of 1979, provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government may enact statutes 
without conflict with the national laws and administrative regulations to be applied 
within t he ju r i sd ic t ion .64 The Local Organic Law was amended in 1986 to allow that 
provincial capitals and other big cities approved by the State Council may make local 
statutes and become effective after the approval by the corresponding provincial 
people's congresses. The NPCSC also made respective resolutions in 1988, 1992, 1995 
and 1996 to grant legislative powers to the five special economic zones (SEZs): Hainan, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen，； Consequently, the period from 1979 through 
1985 recorded a total number of 707 local regulations, the second half of the 1980s 
1220.66 and there had been some 6,300 pieces of local legislation by the end of June 
1998.67 
The rapid increase in the quantity of local legislation produces significant effects 
on central-provincial legal arrangement in China. The case study of Guangdong in the 
next chapter will give more details concerning local legislation and its implications. 
64 The Organic Law of Local People 's Congresses and Local People 's Governments, enacted by NPC in 
1979, Article 6. 
65 See, for example, Di qijie renmin daibiao dahui di e ci huiyi guanyu guowuyuan diqing shenyi 
shouquan shenzhen shi zhiding shenzhen jingji tequ fagui he guizhang deyi'an de jueyi {The decision of 
the second plenum of the seventh Guangdong Provincial People ‘ Congress concerning the motion of 
empowering Shenzhen municipality to make statutes for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone). 
66 Richard Siao and Yuanling Chao, "Editors' introduction," Chinese law and government, vol. 27 no. 1， 
January 1994, pp. 3-9. 
67 South China Morning Post, 24 June 1998. 
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3.3 Assessing legal localism 
The general legal framework and four types oflegal documents are analyzed in 
this chapter to measure the opportunities they offer for local political elites to determine 
local policies. These legal documents specify the functions of local government and 
empower local government to carry out such functions with a certain degree of 
discretion. On the other hand, they also serve as an important means for the center to 
exercise unified leadership and control over the local government. Together with the 
characters of omni-competence and dual subordination, these documents reveal that an 
absolute majority of the functions concerning public services are carried out by local 
government, and local government has a high degree of discretion in some pure local 
matters. In this sense the Chinese system is less centralized than the French one, whose 
prefectoral tradition has ruled that these local matters can hardly be done without priori 
o^ 
central approval. 
However, the character of dual subordination of the government system has 
given the central and national interests a supreme position over localities. The 
examination of government documents also confirms that in most areas ofpublic 
administration local government has to follow strict central directives. Thus a high 
degree of centralism is present. Clearly, the discretion of local government in China is 
less than that in Britain, in which “once the laws have been passed, local authorities can 
do as they please as long as their actions are within the law, with the only real form of 
central control consisting of quasi-judicial interpretation of legality through, above all, 
68 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 39-40. There have recently been some decentralization reforms in France. For more 
details about the French system of local government, see Alistair Cole, French politics and society, 
London: Prentice Hall, 1998, Chapters 7 and 8. 
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courts and auditors."^^ Considered together, the Chinese local government system is 
situated in the spectrum between typical legal centralism like France and typical legal 
localism like Britain, but closer to the French centralist system. This position of local 
government is similar to that in the Scandinavian c o u n t r i e s， 
The most remarkable difference between China and these developed countries is 
the lesser role the Chinese law plays in specifying the distribution of functions and 
discretion between the center and localities. In most cases national laws only provide 
general guidance, and give the government at the higher levels substantial power to 
control local government. Within the executive branch the State Council and ministries 
are able to exercise a high degree of central control effectively over the provinces, 
including Guangdong. 
69 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 36. 
70 For more details about the Scandinavian countries, see ibid., pp. 38-9; Samuel Humes IV, Local 
governance and national power: a worldwide comparison of tradition and change in local government, 
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 3-10. 
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Chapter 4 Legal assessment II: Guangdong 
After reviewing major characteristics of the legal arrangement of central-local 
relations in China, this chapter focuses on Guangdong province to investigate whether or 
not these opportunities available for the provincial elites to shape local policies change 
over time on the legal scale. Constitutionally Guangdong is no different from other 
provinces in terms of its relationship with Beijing, and national laws and central 
administrative regulations are applied in Guangdong in the same way as they are in other 
provinces. Such laws and regulations do not provide many opportunities for the 
province to determine its own affairs, and the central-Guangdong relationship is 
characterized by legal centralism. As these conditions did not have significant changes 
in the past two decades, this chapter will focus on local legislation in Guangdong, and 
regards local legislation as a major indicator of change on the legal scale. 
When the “special policies, flexible measures" were granted to Guangdong and 
Fujian in 1979, it was explicitly stated and well understood that the special policies 
included speeding up local legislation and enhancing its role. Guangdong has been keen 
to enact local laws since the legislative power was granted to the provincial-level 
people's congresses in 1979. By the end ofl997 Guangdong PPC has promulgated and 
amended 248 local laws, and 93 of them were initiated locally.^' The development of 
local legislation, however, was not straight forward. Nor were local regulations so 
simple that they were always compliant to national laws and central regulations. In 
71 Guangdong sheng Ufa gongzuo huiyi wenjian (yi) (Document of legislative work meeting of Guangdong 
province No. /), pp. 1-3. The 248 laws include those passed for big cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai and Shantou, and some of them have been revised or annulled. This number does not include the 
local laws enacted by Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou after they were granted legislative power. 
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some cases their effects were wide spread in the nation instead ofbeing limited to the 
region. A brief examination of the legislation suggests that a three-stage development 
course ofthe legislative activities: 1) 1978 -1988; 2) 1989 - 1990; 3) 1991 - now. 
4.1 building up a legal framework: 1979 一 1988 
In the very beginning of the reform, several Central Documents provided 
Guangdong, as well as Fujian, with a set of "special policies, flexible measures." These 
documents covered notably the fiscal contract system, the establishment of SEZs in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and the decentralization of authorities in such 
n 
aspects as foreign trade, resource allocation, and price management. In 1981, the 
NPCSC empowered the people's congresses and their standing committees of 
7) 
Guangdong and Fujian to make laws concerning the SEZs in their provinces. Yet 
these general policies had to be further specified and translated into what was 
economically operable. 
Since the PPCs had never made laws before, the first task of Guangdong PPC 
was to set up the working institution for local legislation. The Legal System Committee 
(fazhi weiyuanhui) was first set up within Guangdong PPCSC in 1980, followed by five 
other committees responsible for law, financial and economy, etc. By 1984 the 
legislative institutions in the PPC had been well functioning, and 21 local laws had been 
promulgated, among which eight pieces were concerned with the economy. The PPCSC 
72 For more details, see section 6. 
73 NPCSC, "Resolution of the NPCSC concerning the authorization of the people's congresses and their 
standing committees of Guangdong Province and Fujian Province to make various specific economic 
regulations for their respective Special Economic Zones," Shenzhen Municipality Law and Regulations 
Division (edJ, Collection of rules and regulations of the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province 
ofPRC, vol. 1, p. 8. 
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of Guangdong regards the period from 1979 to 1984 as the first phase of legislative 
development in Guangdong, which was mainly to build up the necessary institutions.^^ 
The second phase of the development from October 1984 to the end of l986 saw 
a major advance in the economic legislation. Seventeen regulations were promulgated 
in this period, and eleven of them, respectively concerning enterprise/company 
registration, labor employment, land administration, commodity housing, company 
involving foreign parties, contracts involving foreign parties, bankruptcy, and so and so, 
were related to the economy or the SEZs. 
As Guangdong was the first in the nation to make such kind of laws, many of 
them have served as a model for other provinces, the NPC, and the State Council. 
Indeed, while legislation for other economic zones or provinces was not available, 
foreign investors often negotiated conditions by referring to those regulations in 
Shenzhen SEZ. For example, the Regulation of the Shenzhen SEZ concerning 
Economic Contracts involving Foreign Parties promulgated by the Guangdong PPCSC 
in 1984 filled the void that the People's Republic had lacked a contract legislation 
regulating international transaction. Ajournalist has recorded the impacts of the 
Provision: 
Not only has it had an immediate impact on the many negotiations currently 
underway in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, but the legislation has also 
been invoked ‘for reference' by Chinese negotiators in other zones. Chinese 
lawyers even refer to it when negotiating investments elsewhere in China, 
claiming that the long-awaited foreign economic contract law will resemble 
Shenzhen's. Moreover, the 14 Chinese coastal cities that have recently been 
74 Legal Committee of Guangdong PPCSC, "Guangdong difang lifa shi nian gaikuang (An overview of ten 
year's legislative work in Guangdong.), China Law Yearbook, 1990, pp. 869-3. 
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authorized to create economic development zoiies are carefully studying the 
pros and cons of Shenzhen's legislation, and may adopt it in whole or in p a r t ” 
What the lawyers had predicted was true. The NPCSC enacted the national Law 
of PRC Concerning Economic Contracts involving Foreign Parties in March 1985, one 
year after the Shenzhen law, with similar provisions. 
The legislative development in Guangdong entered a third phase with the 
*7A 
amendment of the Local Organic Law in December 1986. In this period the 
institutions and techniques for legislation had been much improved, and various types of 
laws, including those for legislative procedure, registration of social associations {shehui 
tuanti), and autonomous county {zizhi xian), were enacted. Among the 57 laws enacted 
or amended,77 thirteen pieces dealt directly with economic activities involving foreign 
7Q 
parties, and more were to give details in governing the economic activities. 
In short, the legislation in Guangdong in this period had established a more and 
more specific legal framework for the economy of the province and especially the SEZs. 
In this process the province had not only acquired new functions such as registration of 
companies involving foreign parties, but also provided a leading role in some legislation 
by providing models and experiences for other areas and the central government. 
75 Jerome Alan Cohen, "Shenzhen's New Contract Law: a model for China?" The China Business Review, 
vol. 11, no. 5, September-October 1984, pp. 16-7. 
76 Legal Committee of Guangdong PPCSC, "Guangdong difang lifa shi nian gaikuang (An overview of ten 
year's legislative work in Guangdong).” 
77 Data are calculated from the Guangdong sheng difangfagui zong mulu (A complete list of the local 
regulations of Guangdong province) provided by the Guangdong PPC. Unless otherwise specified, all 
data concerning the number of Guangdong legislation were from or calculated from the same source. 
Appendix I is the translation of this list. 
78 Sen Lin, "A new pattem of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers in economic 
legislation." See also Zhou Hua, "Guangdong waishang touzi falu huanjing de xianzhuang yu duice" 
("Current conditions and strategies oflegal environment concerning foreign investments in Guangdong," 
Xueshu yanjiu {Academic Research), 1988, no.l, pp. 37-42, 
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4.2 Recession: 1989-1990 
Increasingly serious corruption, accelerating inflation, growing public discontent, 
and the intensified power struggle within the central leadership had triggered series of 
student movements since April 1989. The Communist Party survived its biggest crisis 
since the history of the People's Republic by using military force on June 4. Gone were 
the reform minded leaders like Zhao Ziyang. Beijing subsequently adopted a hard-line 
conservative approach for economic management. 
Guangdong saw only six laws enacted in 1989, and again in 1990, the lowest 
since 1985. No law concerning economy was enacted in 1989. Such finding suggests 
the lack of strength of local legislation vis-a-vis the central government and other social 
factors. Despite the fact that law making had become an ‘‘increasingly large and 
important part" of China's policy making, if the legal system had obtained a sufficient 
degree of autonomy, if the so-called ideology of law had really taken root in China, the 
legislation should not have come to a stop despite the change of central policies. 
4.3 Legislation of interests: 1991 - now 
The legislative pace only speeded up since 1991. A new record of seventeen 
pieces was made in 1992, the year when China's late patriarchal leader Deng Xiaoping 
toured to the South to call for faster steps in reform in Spring. The reformist policy was 
further confirmed in October when the CCP Fourteenth Congress adopted the notion that 
China was building up its socialist "market economy." The beginning of the new era of 
legislation was marked by the Eighth NPC held in March 1993, in which reform minded 
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leaders Qiao Shi and Tian Jiyun were respectively elected as chairman and first vice-
chairman. Qiao and Tian, having been in the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of 
judiciary and security work and vice-premier of the State Council respectively, have not 
only good experience in legislation, but also high political status. They are eager and 
energetic to promote legislation - economic legislation in particular - and the supervisory 
function of the people's congress over the government. Qiao Shi even visited 
Guangdong in April 1993 and expressed his hope that Guangdong might become a 
‘‘testing field {shiyan tiany, of legislative work. Guangdong cadres appeared 
Q^ 
encouraged by Qiao's visit and the pace of legislation sped up. Inspired by these 
leaders, the corresponding Eighth Guangdong PPC and its standing committee enacted 
or amended 151 laws in the period from 1993 to 1997, outnumbering all the total ofthe 
laws made between 1979 to 1992. 
Under such circumstances, the role of Guangdong PPC has become more and 
more diversified. As local legislation is governing more and more local affairs, the 
corresponding government departments have to be involved in the legislation process 
and have their interests articulated. When bills are drafted by the departments 
concerned, which is often the case, the department may take this advantage and write the 
bill in its own interest. Therefore, many departments are eager to draft and propose bills 
which protect and advance their own interest, even though this is beyond their authority 
(yuequan Ufa). Another means is that some departments may make regulations that have 
been made before by other departments {congfu Ufa). Seemingly it only repeats the 
legislation, but by doing so the department that makes the new regulation obtains the 
79 Qiao's visit had been mentioned on many occasions by leaders of Guangdong PPCSC such as Zhu 
Senlin. See, for example, Guangdong sheng Ufa gongzuo hniyi wenjian (yi) (Document of legislative 
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explanatory power of the corresponding legislation, and becomes able to redefine the 
provisions in these l a w s . 
Local authorities may also take advantage of local legislation in defending 
provincial interests before central ministries. Unlike the subordination relationship that 
exists between different levels of the Party or government hierarchy, a people's congress 
can only guide and supervise the people's congresses at the lower levels (zhidao 
guanxi). In practice, due to the lack of review procedure, the NPC or NPCSC rarely 
revoke the decision or legislation made by the provincial people's congress, even ifthe 
local law conflicts with the national laws.^' 
There havd been evidences early in the 1980s that local legislation has been 
involved in protecting local interests against central ministries. For example, 
Heilongjiang Province had successfully collected a pollution fine from an enterprise run 
by a central ministry by enforcing the local environmental protection law made by its 
QO 
people's congress. For Guangdong, this problem has been clearly pointed out by the 
Chairman of Guangdong PPC incumbent Zhu Senlin that some departments have 
attempted to legalize their interests by legislation.^^ This is most apparently displayed in 
the feud between the Guangdong PPCSC and Guangdong Provincial State Land 
Department in 1993. 
work meeting of Guangdong province No. 7), 15 April 1998. 
8° Guangdong sheng Ufa gongzuo huiyi wenjian (yi) (Document of legislative work meeting of Guangdong 
province No. /), 15 April 1998，pp. 16-7. 
Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu {The institution of the people 's congress in China), Beijing: 
Shehui Kexue Wenxian Press, 1992, pp. 255-7. 
82 Chen Hongbo, "Difang xing fagui de xiaoli" (The effect of local law), Zhengzhiyu falu, no. 2, 1986, pp. 
33-6. 
83 Guangdong sheng Ufa gongzuo huiyi wenjian (yi) (Document of legislative work meeting ofGuangdong 
province No. 7), pp. 16-7, 
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4.3.1 The case of the Regulation for Property Registration 
On July 6, 1994, the Guangdong PPCSC passed the Regulation of Guangdong 
Province concerning Urban Property Registration. Accordingly, "when a new house is 
ready for use, the real estate property owners shall approach the proper authorities taking 
with him the land-use certificate and other relevant documents to apply for the 
confirmation and registration ofliis property rights, to collect a new real estate property 
rights certificate, and have his land-use certificate canceled; when a new commercial 
building is ready for use, the developer shall register his property rights with the proper 
authorities and retum his land-use certificate to have it canceled." (Article 8) Under the 
new regulation, both the land use rights and property rights are administered by the 
property management department, and the function of the Provincial State Land 
Department has been eliminated in effect. The Land Department, however, issued two 
telegrams a few days after the Regulation was passed to instruct its subordinate 
departments to ignore the stipulations in the Regulation since they were not 
"appropriate." 
In the past the government departments could hardly be challenged for doing so. 
However, when rule oflaw and the supervision of people's congresses over government 
were stressed in propaganda, the story was quite different. The head of the Land 
Department was summoned to the Guangdong PPCSC meeting and questioned by the 
deputies. Local radio and television had allocated a long section reporting the meeting 
and deputies' opinions, pressing the Land Department to correct its “illegal，，activities. 
The case was further reported in many local and central newspapers and magazines as 
propaganda to boost the rule of law. Finally the Land Department revoked its 
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instructions by issuing another document, and made an written apology to the 
Guangdong PPCSC.^^ For China, where rule oflaw has been lacking for long, this case 
made a clear statement that the people's congresses had already exercised some real 
power over the government. 
This was no end of the story, however. What public attention had missed in this 
case was the fact that the Land Department did not really do wrong. The Land 
Department followed the national laws in instructing its subordinate agencies to ignore 
the Guangdong regulation. According to the “State Land Management Law,” land 
owners shall apply to the "land management department under the government at county 
level and above for land registration," (Article 4), and whenever the land use rights are 
changed in such activities as selling, buying or transferring, the parties involved "shall 
apply to the land management department under the local people's government at the 
county level and above for registration of the change of land ownership and land-use 
rights, and will then collect a new land certificate from the local government." (Article 
6)85 The fact is, Guangdong PPCSC had made a local law incongruent with the central 
laws. 
In fact this was not the first time that Guangdong enacted local laws 
contradicting national laws. Ajournalist has noted that "Guangdong, which has been 
making the pace in China's reform and opening up, has repeatedly taken measures 
which skillfully circumvent state laws to deal with certain situations and then has the 
84 See, for example, Guangzhou Ribao (Guangzhou ribao), various issues in Period from July to 
September, 1994; see also Renmin zhi sheng{Voice of the people), July, August, September, and October, 
1994. 
85 FBIS China Daily Report, 19 January 1995, pp. 71-3. 
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measures legalized through local legislation."^^ For instance, the Regulation concerning 
Land Administration in Shenzhen SEZ passed by Guangdong PPCSC in 1987 was the 
first piece in the nation to allow the commercial transaction of land use rights in 
Shenzhen, but it violated the stipulation in the Constitution that forbade the selling and 
buying of state-owned land in cities.^^ 
Some questions are worthy of investigation in this case. In the first place, why 
did the Provincial Land Department dare to issue the two telegrams in defiance ofthe 
Provincial regulation? According to an interviewee, this was directly related to the 
departmental interest of the Land Department. Under the new regulation the land use 
certificate and the property ownership certificate became one, and the Land Department 
was deprived of the business of issuing the land use certificate after the property was 
registered. Consequently, the corresponding fee of processing the land use certificate 
would not come into the coffer of the Department, which led to the Department's strong 
opposition to the new regulation. 
Why did a local people's congress dare to made laws that contradict the national 
laws? A reasonable explanation is that local legislation has become a means to protect 
local interests. For example, the Shenzhen Land Administration Regulation have played 
a crucial role in Shenzhen's real estate development. Also, the Guangdong Property 
Registration Regulation was aimed to boost the real estate market by simplifying the 
0 0 
property registration procedure. So far such behavior seems to have been tolerated. 
86 Wang Mannuo, "Property law unexpectedly enacted by Guangdong contradicts central law," Lien ho 
pao, translated as "Guangdong laws contradict state laws," in FBIS-Chi, 19 January 1995, pp. 71-3. 
87 Sen Lin, "A new pattem of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers in economic 
legislation," China information, vol. 7, no. 3, Winter 1992-3, pp. 27-38. 
88 Interviewees 1 and 3 confirmed this speculation. It was also argued that the Guangdong Regulations 
could not help the real estate market but confuse the property developers and consumers. For this 
argument, see FBIS - China, 19 January 1995, pp. 71-3. 
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Neither of these “illegal” local laws has been claimed void. When the case about the 
Guangdong regulation for property registration was reported to the center, the NPCjust 
OQ 
acquiesced. In the Shenzhen case, indeed, it was the Constitution that was changed to 
adapt to local l a w s ， 
In short, after several stages of development, local legislation has represented 
more local interests and obtained a certain degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the central 
government and the executive branch of the same level. Local legislation may be 
concerned about implementing details of some national laws or regulations, or be 
initiated completely locally. In either type local legislation will have to take more local 
circumstances into consideration and may embody more local interests. Local 
legislation enjoys higher authority status than local administrative regulations, and 
cannot be easily revoked by higher level of government or people's congresses. 
Political elites in Guangdong have been able to take such advantage to coordinate and 
organize local interests, and in some cases they effectively redefines the functions and 
discretion of local governments. 
4.4 Development of other provinces: a comparison 
Worthy of pointing out, local legislation in some other provinces has also made a 
big progress since 1993. As a result, Guangdong's role as a pioneer of legislation has 
been considerably weakened, if not vanished at all.^ ^ The special policies to Guangdong 
are no more "special" as more and more provinces have acquired similar provisions 
89 Informed by interviewee 3. 
卯 Sen Lin, "A new pattern of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers in economic 
legislation." 
40 
from Beijing after ten years of contention. Many other regions are trying new policies 
and making new legislation to facilitate their own development zones and new projects. 
Guangdong has become one among the many to grope its way for development, 
economically or legally. This can be clearly seen when the legislative work in 
Guangdong is compared with that in other provinces, particularly Sichuan province. 
Apart from the legislative power of the provincial people's congress specified in 
the Local Organic Law, Guangdong was granted authority to enact laws applied in its 
SEZs. Interior province, such as Sichuan, did not have this special legislative authority 
at the beginning ofthe reform, although it was also encouraged by Beijing to attract 
foreign investment. Sichuan, therefore, had to follow strict and far less favorable central 
policies in dealing with foreign investors. The special legislative status in Guangdong 
had triggered off demands from other provinces for equal treatment, and Beijing was 
extending the legislative power to some coastal cities to enact laws similar to those in 
Guangdong. Interior provinces like Sichuan did not obtain the legislative power of the 
kind in this period, and they were only allowed to promulgate administrative 
Q^  
regulations. The administrative regulations, however, enjoyed lower status than those 
local laws passed by the provincial people's congress, and they were often unsuccessful 
presumably because of the lack of experience in dealing with foreign investment.^^ In 
this period, legislation in Guangdong was more advanced than that in Sichuan in either 
quantity and quality (Table 3). 
91 See, for example, Carl Goldstein, "Legal aid: China develops business law by looking to Guangdong," 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 November 1993, pp. 71-72. 
92 Sen Lin, "A new pattern of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers in economic 
legislation." 
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Table 3 Number of legislation passed by some provinces 
1979-1989~~1992-1993 f m i ^ T ^ 
(1992-95) 
Guangdong M ^ ^ ^ m 
Sichuan 51 48 31 59 138 
Liaoning 59 39 52 67 158 
Shandong ^ 34 M 4^ 133 
Sources: 1. ChinaLaw Yearbook, 1990 and 1996; 
2. Editorial committee of China Law Yearbook (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo difang xing 
fagui huibian (A compilation of local legislation in PRC) 1992-1994, Beijing: Zhongguo Falu 
Nianjian She, 1995. 
While Qiao Shi and Tian Jiyun urged Guangdong to become a “testing field 
{shiyan tiany, of legislative work, other provinces were also encouraged by the leaders' 
call. Local legislation sped up not only in Guangdong, but almost in all the provinces. 
By 1995, Sichuan, as well as Shandong and Liaoning, had overtaken Guangdong in 
terms of the quantity of the legislation. Indeed the total number of new legislation 
Guangdong enacted from 1992 to 1995 became the smallest among the four provinces 
(Table 3). Sichuan Province has also become bold in legislation, and took a leading 
position in some areas. The Private Enterprise Regulation of Sichuan Province enacted 
in 1994, for example, was the first legislation in the field in China.^^ 
As the same as that in Guangdong, local legislation in many provinces has 
represented more and more local and departmental interests. Many provinces have 
enacted local laws which are out of the scope of their legislative power fyue quan lifa), 
or repeatedly enact local laws that embody departmental interests {congfu lifa)?^ 
93 Ibid. 
94 China Law Yearbook 1995, pp. 865-866. 
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4.5 Major findings 
This chapter focuses on local legislation in Guangdong to assess the legal 
opportunities available for the political elites in the province to shape local policy. It is 
found that Guangdong has been active in local legislation, and the quantity of local laws 
increased rapidly in the last two decades. Such a large number of local legislation have 
specified many new functions and their corresponding discretion for local government, 
and therefore offered opportunities for local political elites to shape local policies. In 
other words, local legislation has produced greater legal localism in Guangdong. Such a 
pattem of change is not limited to Guangdong. The vigorous development of local 
legislation in other provinces means that greater legal localism may be a national trend. 
It is also found that there are many local and departmental interests embodied in 
local legislation, and sometimes local legislation may even re-define the authorities of 
local government in the local interests against central directives. Implications of this 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
95 Liu Hailiang et. al. (eds.), Zhongguo difang fazhijianshe (The construction of local legal system in 
China), pp. 211-2. 
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Chapter 5 Political Assessment I: China 
Apart from employing the opportunities offered in the formal legal documents, 
local political elites may shape local policies by influencing national decisions that 
affect the locality. Such influence of the locality depends upon the degree to which local 
interest is represented in the center, which is measured against the political scale.^^ This 
chapter assesses the central-provincial arrangement against the political scale. The 
following session will first discuss Page's methodology and its adaptation in the Chinese 
context. The chapter will then proceed to the conventional approach of measuring 
political localism, followed by an analysis of the mechanism that ensures central leaders' 
paying special attention to the provinces. The last section will give an overall 
assessment ofthe opportunities available for Chinese local government system on the 
political scale. 
5.1 Page's methodology 
According to Page, the political scale has to do with ensuring local interests 
represented in the center.^^ A conventional method employed by both Mackenzie and 
Page is to count the numbers of the members ofParliament (MPs) and cabinet members 
who have local experience, and calculate their weight (percentage) in the national 
decision making bodies. Another method is more delicate, which is concerned about 
“the mechanism which ensures that national politicians pay special attention to the 
96 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 6. 
97 Ibid., p. 5. 
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demands and interests of local government."^^ Both of the two methods investigate 
what Page calls as the direct route of access, in which local demands are advanced 
directly to the center.^^ 
There is also an indirect route for advancing local interests. In Westem 
democracies exist many national groups representing local authorities, such as the 
Association of District Council in Britain, and the Association des Maires de France, 
through which local authorities may exert their influence indirectly to the center. For 
example, on demand of local government officials, an association of mayors may seek to 
secure a change in legislation that affects local services.^^^ In China, despite that there 
have been some evidences of ‘‘collective bargaining" between some provinces and the 
center, ioi the national organizations by local government officials comparable to those 
in Britain or France have not yet come into being. Indeed, it is questionable whether the 
interest group in Western sense exists in China, not to say those formed by mayors or 
provincial governors. Thus, the rest of the Chapter will only discuss the direct route of 
access. 
5.2 The conventional approach 
As far as the political scale is concerned, local political elites' opportunity to 
shape local policies refers to the influence of local political elites in the national decision 
making arena. As a general rule, the more local interests are represented in the center, 
98 lbid., p. 38. 
99 Ibid., p. 42. 
iaaibid. 
101 For example, the five provinces in Southwest China (Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, Guizhou, Guangxi) had 
put forward their demands collectively. See Wu Guoguang and Zheng Yongnian, Lun zhongyang-difang 
guanxi: zhongguo zhidu zhiiaming zhong de yige zhouxin wenti {On the central-local relationship: a core 
problem of institutional transition in China), pp. 38-41. 
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the more will be the local influence in the center, and therefore the more opportunities 
local officials will have. To measure the representation of local interest in the center, 
Mackenzie counts the percentages of MPs who have had local experience in seven 
1 ^^  
unitary states in Europe and makes comparison. So does Page, and he also compares 
the percentage of those cabinet members who have had worked in the areal offices.!*" 
As will be shown later, such a statistical analysis may sometimes be misleading, and 
especially so when applied in China. However, it is a good starting point for our 
investigation into the political arrangement in China. 
5.2.1 The National People ,s Congress 
The NPC in China consists of nearly three thousand people's deputies. While it 
is impossible to look into their experiences one by one, we can estimate their 
background according to constituencies. In the Seventh NPC in 1988, for example, 
2396 deputies, or 80 percent, out of the total of2978 were local representatives elected 
from different provinces, autonomous regions, and municipals directly under the central 
government (Tables 4 ) . ^ The percentage of local deputies in China, as is shown, was 
certainly a high one (Table 5). However, this does not mean strong local representation 
in the national legislature when taking the fact into consideration that the elections are 
firmly controlled by the Party. As a result, the deputies represent less of localities than 
the will of the Party, which is a highly centralized organization emphatic on national 
unity rather than local interest. 
102 W.J.M. Mackenzie, "Local government in parliament." 
103 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, pp. 57-61. 
104 According to interviewee 3, sometimes deputies elected from a province may not really from the 
province. The center may assign a people's congresses to elect a few deputies outside that constituency. 
However, the deputies thus elected are very small in number and may be neglected. 
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Table 4 The composition ofthe Seventh NPC, 1988 
Constituency Number of representatives Percentage 
Sichuan m M 
Shandong 167 5.6 
Henan 142 4.8 
Liaoning 136 4.6 
Guangdong 131 4.1 
Jiangsu 123 4.1 
Heilongjiang 121 3.5 
Zhejiang 105 3.5 
Hunan 104 3.4 
Hubei 102 3.4 
Hebei 100 3.2 
Anhui 95 3.2 
Jilin 82 2.6 
r 
Jiangxi 76 2.6 
Guizhou 65 2.2 
Shanxi 65 2.1 
Guangxi 64 2.1 
Fujian 62 2.1 
Shanxi 60 2.0 
Shanghai 59 2.0 
Yunnan 59 2.0 
Neimenggu 56 1.9 
Beijing 49 1.6 
Tianjin 43 1.4 
Gansu 39 1.3 
Xinjiang 38 1.3 
Xizang 16 0.5 
Qinghai 16 0.5 
Ningxia 16 0.5 
Taiwan 13 0.4 
Central Government 222 7.5 
People's Liberation Army 265 8.9 
Ethnic minorities 75 2.5 
Hong Kong and Macau 20 0.7 
— Total ^ 9 ^  
Source: Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu {The institution of the people 's congress in 
China), Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Press, 1992, p. 133. 
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5.2.2 The CCPPolitburo 
The cabinet in Western democracies corresponds most closely to the CCP 
Politburo in China.'^^ Name lists of the Politburo and its members' background are 
available in major newspapers in China, and based on this the percentages of Politburo 
members with local experiences can be calculated. Here local experience is counted 
only if the members had occupied the leading posts, that is, the Party secretary or 
governor, of either the provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under 
the central government after 1949. This is a stricter criterion for local experience than 
that applied in Page's study, nevertheless it is still found that proportionally more 
leaders in the national decision making core had local experience than in those westem 
democracies (Tables 5 and 6). Similar results are found for the Politburo Standing 
Committee. 
Table 5 Percentage of national politicians having local government background 
Percentage of national politicians having 
local government background  
MPs Cabinet 
(1980s) (1987) 
Britain Ys L4 
France 75 53 
Italy 48 20 
Sweden 80 N/A 
Norway 85 50 
Spain 19 29 
Denmark 44 26 
China ^ ^  
* The cabinet refers to the Politburo in China. The calculation method is available at the latter part. 
Sources: 1. Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe, p.59. 
2. Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu (The institution of the people 's congress in 
China), Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Press, 1992, p. 133. 
3. Renmin ribao, of various dates in the specified months. 
105 For details about the Politburo, see Pu Xinzu et.al. (eds.) Dangdai zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu {The 
political institutions of contemporary China), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press, 1989, pp. 462-9. 
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Another feature of the Chinese system is that there were always a few Politburo 
members who concurrently held positions as provincial leaders (Table 6). This only 
happens in France among the seven countries Page studies, which is called the cumul des 
mandats, or the cumul principle. The presence of this practice means the existence of 
ample opportunities for these local leaders to influence national decisions in the interests 
oflocali t ies. i06 it is also interesting to know whether the proportion of the Politburo 
Table 6 Politburo members with local experiences, 1977-97 
Total no. of the Members with local Members with concurrent 
Politburo members experience local positions  
Number % Number % 
Aug. 1977 S M ^ 5 ^ 
Dec. 1978 27 15 56 5 19 
Sep. 1979 29 17 59 5 17 
Feb. 1980 25 15 60 4 16 
Sep.1982 25 16 64 1 4 
Sep. 1985 20 11 55 1 5 
Oct. 1987 17 10 59 4 24 
Jun.1989 15 8 53 4 27 
Oct. 1992 20 10 50 5 25 
Nov. 1997 ^ lJ 59 5 23 
Source: Counted from the data on Renmin ribao of various dates in the specified months. 
members with local experiences changed over time since the reform was introduced in 
1978. Table 6 shows that while the percentage of leaders with local experience was 
quite stable in more than two decades, the proportion of those with concurrent local 
positions had been fluctuating and peaked at two periods, in 1977 and 1989 respectively. 
Both periods were most unstable politically. It seems reasonable that whenever Beijing 
106 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 60. 
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is undergoing difficulties or severe power struggles, the center tends to co-opt more 
provincial leaders into its core decision-making arena. 
5.3 The mechanism of maintaining local representation 
The statistics in the conventional method does tell something, but the figures 
may also be misleading. The contrast between the high proportion of local deputies and 
the ineffective representation of local interest in the NPC serves as an example in point. 
There is neither guarantee that those in the cabinets with local experiences will speak for 
the localities, for it is not known whether they identify themselves as national figures or 
local representatives after entering the national decision-making arena. However, either 
local representatives in the Parliament or cabinet members with local experience do 
provide some mechanism which enables national politicians to listen to the local 
voices.io7 Indeed a more important question is like this: is there any incentive for the 
national politicians to pay special attention to the demands and interests of the localities? 
What kind of local interests does the center care? 
5.3.1 Patron-clientelism in Italy 
The Italian system offers a good illustration about why national politicians are 
interested in local affairs. In Italy a multi-party and proportional electorate system is in 
practice, and whether or not a party candidate can get elected to the national chamber 
depends heavily upon local notables, especially the grandi-elettori, who greatly 
influence the vote by recommending appropriate candidates to the electorate. 
Consequently, the party has to provide benefits for the grandi-elettori to exchange their 
support. In addition, parties in Italy have formed a tradition of relying on government 
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employment to reward party supporters from the public coffer. The national parties, 
therefore, have to be concerned about local government so as to offerjobs for party 
workers and supporters. In so doing, national politicians have to listen to the local 
political elites, who may therefore exert their influence in the national political arena. 
Clearly, this is a mark of political localism. In contrast, such a patron-clientelist 
mechanism is largely absent in Britain and the Scandinavian countries.^^^ 
5.3.2 Reciprocal accountability and particularism in China 
Unlike those European countries, China does not have real electorate and 
democratic party systems. The number one person in the province - the secretary ofthe 
provincial communist party {shengwei shujf), is largely appointed by the Party Center. 
Similarly, although formally the governor of the province is elected by the provincial 
people's congress, the whole election process is in effect maneuvered by the Party. The 
election for people's deputies to the NPC follows similar pattern. 
Clearly, provincial leaders in China embody central and Party wi l l .^ But why 
does the center have interest in controlling provincial leaders and local policies, even if 
they neither threaten the position of the center, nor undermine the integration of the 
nation? Reasons for this are multiple. One is the tradition of centralism to which the 
Chinese peoplejust have got used to: historically all the officials were appointed by the 
emperor, and a lot of affairs could not be done without priori approval from the 
iG7 lbid.,p.61. 
108 ibid., pp. 62-5. 
109 David S.G. Goodman, Center and provinces in the People 's Republic of China, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p. 76; Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet prefects: the local party organs in industrial 
decision-making, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 406;Victor C. 
Falkenheim, "Continuing central predominance," Problem of communism, vol. 21, no. 4, July-August 
1972, pp. 75-83. 
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center.MG The center mayjust think it is right to be concerned with and control local 
affairs. 
A more reasonable explanation is related to the authority structure ofthe regime. 
In the People's Republic, the Chinese regime is no less authoritarian than those in the 
history, and one may even say it is totalitarianism. However, the authority in China 
today has become increasingly fragmented. The vertical fragmentation results from 
rounds of decentralization since Mao's period that aimed to devolve authorities of the 
State Council and central ministries to the lower levels lest the provincial and local 
initiatives be "stifled."^'^ This has led Lampton and Lieberthal to characterize Chinese 
1 1 ’ 
politics by the model of"fragmented authoritarianism." 
The authority is not only fragmented vertically, but also horizontally. This is 
manifest in the constant power struggle within the central leadership. Shirk argues, for 
example, the proximate cause of the 1978 reform was the succession contest between 
Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, and "the very origins of Chinese economic reform 
bore the mark of political competition among ambitions politicians."^^^ No sooner had 
Deng secured his position than a discord about the direction of the reform within the 
central leadership occurred. The decentralist and open-door policy adopted by the 
11° For authorities of the central and regional governments in different dynasties, see Yang Hongnian and 
Ouyang Xin, Zhongguo zhengzhi shi {Chinese history of political institution), Hefei: Anhui Jiaoyu Press, 
1988. 
1" For details, see Franz Schumann, Ideology and organization in communist China, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969; Victor Falkenheim, "Decentralization and control in Chinese local 
administration," Daniel Nelson (ed.), Local politics in communist countries, Lexington: University Press 
ofKentucky, 1980, pp. 191-210. 
112 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, "Introduction: the 'fragmented authoritarianism' model and its limitations," 
Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, (eds.), Bureaucracy, politics, and decision making in post-
Mao China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 1-30. I 
� Susan L. Shirk, The political logic of economic reform in Chirm, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993,p. 
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radical group of leaders headed by Deng had been constantly contested by another group 
of dogmatic socialist leaders who favored central planning. 
To secure their positions, central leaders had to raise provincial supports by 
granting favorable policies to individual provinces, which Shirk calls as “playing to the 
provinces.,,H4 lf the vertical fragmentation of authority has already given provinces 
ample opportunities to bargain with the center, the "playing to the provinces” further 
complicates the central-provincial relations. Lampton even argues that it is best to view 
the Chinese regime as a "bargaining system."' '^  Thus, some provincial leaders, 
especially those with Politburo membership, obtain great bargaining power and dare to 
demand a lot because they know the center will have to offer benefits to their regions in 
exchange for their support. This is indeed a kind of patron-clientelism as in the Italian 
case, although it is within a smaller and more elitist leader group. 
5.4 Assessing political localism 
This chapter attempts to give a picture of the political arrangement of the central-
provincial relations. The statistics show that a lot of the members of the NPC and CCP 
Politburo have had local experiences, and there are also a proportion ofPolitburo 
members who concurrently hold provincial leadership. This suggests that the integration 
of the center and provinces in China is high. A more important indicator of political 
localism is the "degree of emphasis upon national politicians maintaining local 
i"Ibid.,Chapters 1 and 
115 David M. Lampton, "Chinese politics: the bargaining treadmill," Issues and studies, vol. 23 no. 3, 
March 1987), pp. 11- 53 
support."' 16 Our study confirms the existence of such mechanism in China, based on 
reciprocal accountability in the central policy-making arena in Beijing. Therefore, 
substantial opportunities are available for local political elites to influence Beijing when 
important decisions concerning the localities are made. In other words, China may be 
classified as the country of political localism, along with such countries as France, Italy, 
and Spain. 
116 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 66. 
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Chapter 6 Political Assessment II: Guangdong 
This chapter investigates the change of political opportunities available for 
Guangdong since 1978. The preceding chapter has suggested that whether a local 
official may influence the national decision makers or not depends not only on the 
degree to which local interest is represented at the center, but also on the interest ofthe 
national decision makers in paying special attention to the locality. The latter, which is 
often associated with patron-clientelism and particularism, becomes especially important 
in China, where a system of local interest representation is largely absent. As is 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Guangdong, from its rise with central support to the loss ofits 
privileges, had undergone a "political cycle" in terms of central patronage within two 
decades. How did this change come about? How did the province respond to such 
changes? What was this change meant in terms of the opportunities for Guangdong 
political elites? This chapter will answer these questions. For convenience, the central-
Guangdong relations will be divided into three phases for discussion. 
6.1 1979-1984: harmonious central-Guangdong relations 
The first phase of central-Guangdong relations we investigate marked the 
initiation of the reform and its beginning stage, broadly from 1978 to 1985. Formally 
Guangdong got its "special policies, flexible measures" only when the Central 
Document No. 50 was issued in July 1979, but the process leading to the issue ofthe 
document may date back to 1978. 
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6.1.1 Preparation of the special policies 
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976，central leaders had focused on 
a goal for which generations of Chinese people had fought: enriching the nation. 
Although there had been different thoughts about how to achieve the goal at the very 
beginning,ii7 national leaders inclined to loosen central control over localities by 
delegating more power to them/^^ Guangdong was the biggest beneficiary in this period 
of decentralization. The initiation of the reform is usually attributed to the reformist 
group headed by Deng Xiaoping, but even Hua Guofeng, then the Party Chairman 
incumbent, was not resistant to this new policy.^^^ Thus, as early as in August 1978, 
Guangdong had begun importing and utilizing foreign capital”*^ 
It has been reported that before the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress 
in December 1978 key officials in Guangdong and Beijing had been given hints about 
1 <-y 1  
the new policy. This shall be in the "central work meeting {zhongyang gongzuo 
huiyi),, preceding the Plenum, in which, according to the Guangdong source, Xi 
Zhongxun, then Guangdong Party secretary, a former vice premier and heavy-weight 
122 
central figure, demanded the center to delegate some authorities to Guangdong. 
117 For a brief description of the three groups respectively headed by Hua Guofeng, Chen Yun and Deng 
Xiaoping, see Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989, pp., 76-8. 
ii8!bid. 
119 Hua gave a speech to the Guangdong delegates in the Fifth NPC meeting on 23 June 1979, and 
mentioned that the special policies would get central approval. See Wu Kangmin, Renda Huiyilu (A 
memoir of the people's congress), Hong Kong: Ming Pao Press, 1990, p. 42. 
120 Zhonggong guangdong shengwei giianyu fahui guangdong youyiie tiaojian, kuoda duiwai maoyi, 
jiakuaijingjifazhan de baogao (The report of the Communist Party Guangdong Provincial Committee on 
givitigfull play to favorable conditions, expanding foreign trade, and accelerating economic 
development), Guangdong: Provincial Party Committee, 1979. 
121 Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, p. 84. 
122 Editorial Committee, Dangdai zhongguo de guangdong {Contemporary Guangdong in China), Beijing: 
Dangdai Zhongguo Press, 1991, p. 145. See also Xi Zhongxun, "Zongjiejingyan,jixu qianjin (Sum up 
the experiences, and move on),，，Xi Zhongxun, Xi Zhongxun wenxuan (A collective ofXi Zhongxun 's 
works), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1995, pp. 480-4. 
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The later story has been well recorded. Xi, together with Wang Quanguo, 
another high official in Guangdong, strongly argued for more autonomy - including a 
123 
set of special policies and the setting up of"special export zones (chuko tequJ, - for 
Guangdong in the central work meeting in April 1979,^ ^^ and got central approvaL^^^ A 
task force headed by then vice-premier Gu Mu was subsequently sent to Guangdong in 
May. The financial contract arrangement between Beijing and Guangdong, the most 
126 
important provision of the special policies, was announced by Gu Mu. Then came the 
Report of the Communist Party Guangdong Provincial Committee on giving full play to 
favorable conditions，expanding foreign trade, and accelerating economic development. 
The report was approved by the center, with the issuing of the well-known Central 
Document (1979) No. 50, which granted Guangdong a set of "special policies and 
flexible measures" (hereafter the ‘‘special policies"). 
6.1.2 Contents of the special policies 
The first and foremost component of the special policies was a fiscal contract 
arrangement under which the province transferred a fixed amount of financial income 
123 The special export zone was renamed as special economic zones when Gu Mu held a work meeting of 
Guangdong and Fujian in Guangzhou in March 1980, before they were officially set up on August 26, 
1980. This meant the Chinese leaders wanted them to perform more functions than export processing 
zones did. For more details, see Li Meiqing, "Ren Zhongyi furen nanyue qianhou (Before and after Ren 
Zhongyi came and headed guangdong),，, Dangdai guangdong {Contemporary Giiangdong), no. 1, 1995, 
pp. 7-11; Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong imder reform, pp. 125-9. 
124 Xi had said that if Guangdong had been an independent nation, its economy would have been much 
better. Xi also took opportunity to report directly to central leaders, and might even suggest the American 
model for central-Guangdong relations. See Liu Tianfu, "Guangdong shixing teshu zhengce he linghuo 
cuoshi de huigu," Dangdai guangdong {Contemporary Guangdong), no. 1, 1995, pp. 18-41; Xi Zhongxun, 
"Zongj ie j ingyan, j ixu qianjin (sum up the experiences, and move on)" Xi Zhongxun, Xi Zhongxun 
wenxuan (A collective ofXi Zhongxim 's works), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1995, pp. 480-4; and 
Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, p. 85. 
125 The request was approved by Ye Jianying and Deng. See Sui Guangjun, Guangdong chiiyu 
zhuanzhedian: guangdong kua shijifazhan yanjiu (Guangdong on turning point: a study ofcross-century 
development in Guangdong), Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Press, 1997, pp. 28-9. The provision was 
also written in the State Council Correspondence [1979] 202, in Zhonggong Guangdong Shengwei 
Bangongting (ed.), Zhongyang dui guangdong gongzuo zhishi huibian: 1979-1982 (ZDGGZH, A 
compilation of central directives on Guangdong's work: 1979-1982), pp. 1-8. 
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(1.2 billion yuan) to Beijing. Under such system, Guangdong would reaped all the fruit 
apart from the fix sum, and therefore became greatly motivated to develop the economy 
and increased the income. Besides, Guangdong was given greater autonomy in deciding 
its own socio-economic plan, more authority over foreign trade and foreign investment 
projects, over the material distribution and commercial system, and over labor and price 
127 
management. 
One year later, the Central Document (1980) No. 41 was promulgated to 
translate the above provisions into more concrete measures and to obtain cooperation 
from central ministries. Among other things, the annual remittance to the center was 
reduced from 1.2 billion yuan to one billion yuan for five years, and Guangdong was 
entitled to issue bonds and stocks to absorb foreign capital - a power normally exercised 
only by the central government. 
6.1.3 Ren Zhongyi ’s period 
In November 1980 Xi and Yang were called back to Beijing, presumably due to 
their lack of experience in enlivening the province's economy and failure to meet leaders 
and people's expectations.^^^ Ren Zhongyi, together with Liang Lingguang, were then 
sent to Guangdong, conveying important directives and high expectations from top 
central leaders. Unlike their predecessors, they received an enthusiastic welcome from 
over five thousand cadres at the first meeting they held one week after their arrival in 
1 ^Q 
Guangdong. 
126ZDGGZH 1979-82, p. 11. 
127 Apart from the document itself (available in many sources, for example, ZDGGZH 1979-82, pp. 18-
40), a briefEnglish summary was also in Peter T.Y. Cheung, "Relations between the central government 
and Guangdong," pp. 26-7. 
128 Zhengming, December 1980, pp. 48-9. Translated in FBIS-China, 9 December 1980, pp. U3-U5. 
129 Ibid. See also Ren Zhongyi, "Jiefang sixiang,jiaqiang tuanjie, ba guangdongjingji gao shang qu 
(Emancipate ideas, unite further, and enliven guangdong economy" (speech given at the meeting of 58 
During his five years’ serving as first Party secretary in the province, Ren had 
masterfully activated the province to achieve economic goals by making full use ofthe 
special policies and flexible measures. “If something is not explicitly prohibited, then 
move ahead," Ren told his associates, and “if something is allowed, then use it to the 
hilt.，，i30 Equally famous was his "three-more" slogan: more open to the outside, more 
leeway to the inside, more decentralization to the inferior {dui wai gengjia kaifang; dui 
nei gengjia fang kuan, dui xia gengjia fang quan). The slogan was so widely recognized 
that it was subsequently written into another important Central Document (1981) No. 
27.131 
6.1.4 Central criticism and Guangdong 's response 
In the first five years of reform, the special policies had been constantly attacked 
by the conservative group ofleaders. Almost each year criticism was heard. The first 
resulted from smuggling and trafficking that involved a number of local leaders, and 
Beijing launched a full-fledge campaign against the economic crime in January 1982, 
with Guangdong as a major national target. In a meeting in Beijing, Chen Yun, who 
never really supported the policy for special economic zones, insisted that the foremost 
task of the zones was to “sum up its experiences" instead of moving ahead.^^^ To fight 
smuggling, an urgent notice by the Party center was issued in January 1982, and some 
cadres' at or above the level of provincial/municipal bureau), Dangdai guangdong {Contemporary 
Guangdong), no. 1, 1995, pp. 12-17, 42. 
130 Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, p. 81. 
131 ZDGGZH 1979-82, ppl61-79. There are also other stories about Ren, including his speech concerning 
three circumstances in which flexibility is permitted (in Nanfang Ribao, 24 June 1984, translated in FBIS-
China 27 June 1984, Pl-P3), and the three-real slogan: special policy really special, flexible measures 
really flexible, one step ahead really ahead {teshii zhengce yao zhen teshu, linghuo ciioshiyao zhen 
linghuo, xian zou yi buyao zhen xian zou)T For more details about Ren's deeds in Guangdong, see Li 
Meiqing, "Ren Zhongyi furen nanyue qianhou (Before and after Ren Zhongyi came and headed 
guangdong)，，； Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, pp. 313-37. 
132 ZDGGZH 1979-82, pp243-4. 
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central heavy-weights were sent to Guangdong, as well as some other provinces, to 
investigate.i33 in February Ren alone was summoned by Beijing to ‘‘talk about" the 
smuggling problem. Finally he got Liu Tianfu, then Governor of Guangdong, 
accompanying, and they defended local leaders and accepted much ofthe blame from 
Bdj ing . i34 
In 1983 a campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" was launched, and its 
negative impact did not die off till Deng and Zhao toured to Guangdong respectively in 
1984.135 Again in 1984 the Hainan car scandal led to the imprisonment of some local 
cadres.i36 The cyclical change of central policy was manifest. But Guangdong leaders 
enjoyed good communication with Beijing during this period, and this had helped to 
release the tension between Beijing and Guangdong. Xi, for example, was reportedly a 
close associate ofDeng, and he became a secretary in the Central Secretariat {zhongyang 
shujichu shuji) after leaving Guangdong」)？ Ren also had a “strong shoulders" to accept 
blames for mistakes and defend his subordinates. Probably more important is the fact 
that the reform policy was initiated and approved by the reformist group in Beijing, and 
the reformists needed to prove that their policy was correct and effective so as to 
accumulate their power in the center. Therefore Beijing was not only willing to give 
more authorities to the Guangdong, but also able to tolerate the mistakes or misconduct 
of the province in implementing the policy. In this sense the reform policy could not 
fail, or it would mean the downfall of the reformist group in Beijing. 
133 ibid., pp. 245-6. 
134 Liu Tianfu, "Guangdong shixing teshu zhengce he linghuo cuoshi de huigu." 
135 Peter T.Y. Cheung, "Relations between the central government and Guangdong," pp. 34-5. 
136. For details, see Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong 
zhengfu {Autonomous behavior of the provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and 
open era), pp. 84-9. 
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6.1.5 The firstfive years of reform 
In short, during the period headed by Xi and Ren, Guangdong started its special 
policy and was moving ahead steadily. By the end of 1985, Guangdong's major 
economic growth rates had been ahead of the nation.'^^ Interestingly enough, the reform 
and its process was largely initiated and dominated by Beijing. Moreover, two 
Guangdong leaders, Xi and Ren, and some other figures who pushed the reform forward 
such as Gu Mu, were in or sent by the reformist group in Beijing. However, this does 
not mean that Guangdong was completely passive at this initial stage. Evidences appear 
to show that while the fiscal contract treatment was put forward by the center, the idea of 
special export zone was first put forward by Guangdong.^^^ Guangdong's proximity to 
Hong Kong and Macau - not only physically but also culturally — its relatively small 
share in the national economy, and its liberal tradition eamed Guangdong credits when 
Beijing considered granting the special policies to the province._ 
The above story suggests that this period of central-Guangdong relationship was 
characterized by good communication between the center and the province and mutual 
support of the two sides. This is manifest in the fact that Xi and Ren were sent by 
Beijing and were to carry out important central policy to Guangdong. This does not 
mean, however, that Xi and Ren only represented central interests in the province. No 
matter how close the provincial leaders were to the center, once they were in the 
province, they were expected to assume the role to represent local interest and fight for 
137 For a while Xi was said to become the General Secretary of CCPCC. Zheng Ming Jih Pao, 1 July 
1981, p.l;translated in FBIS-China, 2 July 1981, W1. 
138 Peter T.Y. Cheung, "Relations between the central government and Guangdong," p. 34. 
139 See particularly Gu Mu's talk to the Guangdong leaders in May 1979, ZDGGZH 1979-82, pp. 9-13 and 
Liu Tianfu, "Guangdong shixing teshu zhengce he linghuo cuoshi de huigu." 
140 Ezra F. Vogel, One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform, pp. 82-3. 
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it. It is clear that the authority was fragmented vertically, and therefore Xi was able to 
argue forcefully for more autonomy to Guangdong, and Ren able to give the special 
policies and flexible measures a full play. 
6.2 1985-1988: the climax ofGuangdong's autonomy 
In July 1985 Ren and Liang left their position, succeeded by Lin Ruo and Ye 
Xuanping respectively/^^ Lin and Ye also enjoyed good communication with Beijing, 
but, unlike their predecessors, both of them are natives of Guangdong and had 
substantial local experience. Lin was said very open minded^ and self-disciplined, 
and each time he went to Beijing, he would visit Zhao Ziyang as private friend.^^^ Ye 
also enjoyed good access to the center, due largely to his father, old marshal Ye 
Jianying. 
6.2.1 State Council Document (1985) No. 46 
Accompanying Lin and Ye's appointment was the atmosphere of more openness 
and reform cumulated in the previous years. The SEZ-styled policies were granted to 
three major river deltas in China, including the Pearl River Delta. In February 1985, 
the State Council Document (1985) No. 46 was issued to confirm the continuation of 
the special policies given to Guangdong. Among other things, the fiscal contract was 
141 The change had been prepared one year before. Reportedly many people recommended Ye to be the 
first Party secretary of the province, but it did not get consent from Deng Xiaoping. Thus Lin became the 
Party secretary. Before this there had been speculation that Ye Xuanping would succeed Xi Zliongxun in 
1980.; South China Morning Post, 6 September 1980, translated in FBIS-China, 8 September 1980, L25. 
142 Tseng Wei, "Lin Ruo may become first secretary of the Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee," 
Tseng Ming, No. 77, 1 August 1984, p. 25, translated in FBIS-China, 2 August 1984, W7-W8. Some 
cadres in Guangdong thought Lin Ruo was very inflexible, however. See Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu 
de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu {Autonomous behavior ofthe provincial 
government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open erd), pp. 35-6. 
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extended for another five years to 1989, and the limit of production project within 
which the province had the discretion to determine was lifted to RMB 200 million and 
USD 10 million.i44 However, unlike the three documents issued in the first three years 
of the reform, this document was issued only under the name ofthe State Council. 
Reasons behind were not clear, due possibly to the program of separating the Party 
from the state {dangzhengfen kai),^^^ or more likely to the difficulties to get 
overwhelming consensus within the Politburo after rounds of criticism to the special 
policies. 
As usual, criticism by the conservatives came again in late 1985, and Deng had 
to admit that “the success of Shenzhen has yet to be proved."^^^ The State Council re-
imposed restrictions on the import of twenty four kinds of commodities and the 
reselling of these commodities to other provinces in December 1986. The student 
demonstrations led to Hu Yaobang,s purge in early 1987 and the promotion ofLi Peng 
and Yao Yilin. This was considered as a blow to the reformist group. Fortunately, 
Zhao Ziyang succeeded Hu as the Secretary General of the Party, and put forward his 
“coastal development strategy" in the Thirteenth Party Congress in late 1987. This 
gave Guangdong even more opportunities, as Zhao had worked in Guangdong for years 
and had been directly involved in the special policies to the province. This coincided 
� Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu 
{Autonomous behavior of the provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open 
era), p. 36. 
144 ZDGGZH 1983-85, pp. 378-91. 
145 The program was introduced in 1987 during the Thirteenth Party Congress. For an introduction about 
the separation of the party and state, see Xie Qingkui et.al. (eds.), Dangdai zhongguo zhengfu {The 
contemporary government of the People 's Republic of China), pp. 44-7. 
146 Carol Lee Harmrin, China and the challenge of the future, Boulder: Westview, 1990, pp. 171-3. For 
more details about the criticism, see Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on the reforms: conservative criticism 
ofpolitical and economic liberalization in China, 1985-86," China quarterly, no. 114, June 1988, pp. 198-
222. 
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with a robust increase of foreign investment in Guangdong. Then Guangdong leaders 
thought that it was the right time to demand for more autonomy. 
6.2.2 State Council Correspondence (1988) No. 25 
Around the period of the Thirteenth Party Congress in November 1987, Lin Ruo 
mentioned about the wish for more decentralization to Zhao, who appeared quite 
147 
interested in the idea. Zhao then asked the province to write him a proposal. 
Subsequently, a proposal was written and submitted to Beijing and with one copy 
directly to Zhao in the name of Guangdong CCP Committee in January 1988, 
demanding for more autonomy in economic administration. Zhao gave his imprimatur 
without delay, and the State Council issued the Correspondence No. 25 on 10 February 
after a brief review. With the document Guangdong had acquired unrivalled autonomy 
in its administration in ten areas. 
For example, in the monetary area, Guangdong was not only allowed to develop 
its stock and security markets, issue bonds, but also to establish its own foreign 
exchange adjustment center. In credit administration, Guangdong would retain all the 
credit loan and saving above the base line of 1988, and entitled to prove projects ofup to 
USD 30 million that did not involve export quotas and licenses or did not need to be 
balanced by the state. In price management, the national government was to stop setting 
mandatory price control target for the province, and Guangdong was to introduce price 
reform at any time it thought apt. Guangdong would have more say in its economic 
planning, and the fiscal contract arrangement was ensured with some adjustment. 
147 Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu 
{Autonomous behavior of the provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open 
era), p. 52. The following was exerted from the same source, which differs from the account by Peter 
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Besides, many more reform measures were approved in principle, including labor 
management, enterprises reform, reform of education and science, and the establishment 
of a civil service system, and so and so/^^ 
The provisions in the document represented the limit of what Guangdong could 
obtain from Beijing during the heyday of the radical reformers. Had all the provisions 
be implemented, Guangdong would had in effect become half-independent, and the 
central-local relations in China would had been different from what is today. The 
foreign exchange center in Guangdong, for example, would imply that RMB might have 
different exchange rates inside the nation. 
However, the document was never fully implemented. The direct reason was the 
runaway inflation and unexpected panic buying in summer 1988, which led to the 
introduction of economic austerity, and the de facto ascendancy ofconservative Li Peng 
and Yao Yilin over the reformists in economic administration.^^^ Besides, unlike the 
documents before, the Correspondence No. 25 was prepared in a rushing way, lacking in 
deliberation among different ministries and leaders.^^o According to an interviewee, the 
document encoded as "correspondence" implies it is tentative and immature for full 
implementation. '^ ^ Therefore, in the political system whose authority was fragmented, 
Cheung ("Relations between the central government and Guangdong"), which was based on the materials 
in ZDGGZH 1986-87. 
148 ZDGGZH 1983-85, pp. 426-41. Briefsummary was also available in Peter T.Y. Cheung, "Relations 
between the central government and Guangdong," pp. 38-40. 
149 For more details, see Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1988: the continuing dilemma of socialist reform,” 
Asian Survey, vol XXIX, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 12-28. 
150 Gu Mu had stressed the importance ofinvolving different ministries and units in making decisions 
concerning the special policies. He said that "because there are many problems, we must exchange get 
together to exchange ideas, have face-to-face deliberation, which cannot be done ifany one unit is 
absent." ZDGGZH 1979-82, p. 58. 
151 View point of interviewee 6. 
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ministries were able to put aside some central instructions, just in the same way as 
Guangdong did to evade some central control. 
For our purpose, the State Council Correspondence No. 25 clearly demonstrates 
the autonomous behavior of the province. Unlike the special policies in 1979, which 
were first initiated by the center, the authorities Guangdong had secured in this 
document were largely the fruit cultivated by the province. 
6.3 1989-97: defending local autonomy 
The students' bloodshed on Tian'anmen Square in 1989 marked the tuming point 
of the central-Guangdong relations. Gone were reformist leaders such as Zhao, replaced 
by Jiang Zemin from Shanghai. Jiang subsequently secured his status as the core ofthe 
third-generation leadership of the People’ Republic. The reform and opening were also 
terminated, replaced by a more severe economic austerity program between late 1988 
and 1991. By the end of 1989, however, Beijing had decided to give more favorable 
policies and full support to Shanghai, which was to became the nation's number-one 
1 r ^ 
basis of reform and opening — yet another blow to Guangdong. Under these 
circumstances a new pattem of central-Guangdong interaction took place. 
6.3.1 Economic retrenchment and Guangdong 's response 
With the austerity program first introduced in late 1988 and becoming more 
intensive, Beijing re-centralized many functions previously devolved to the provinces. 
152 The decision has triggered an open debate between thejoumalists from Shanghai and Guangdong that 
involved many government officials and economists. See Wang Zhigang, "Guangdong he pudong de 
duihua (A dialogue between Guangdong and Pudong),,’ Wang Zhigang, Zoiixiang shichangjing|i de 
zhongguo: Wang Zhigang shehui qushi duihua lu (China towards market economy: a collection of 
dialogues about social trends by Wang Zhigang), Guangzhou: Guangdong Luyou Press, 1993, pp.129-37. 
For more details about the opening up of Shanghai, see Yang Zhongmei, Zhu Rongji zhuan {A biography 
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Guangdong was no exception to this] 53 The province, of course, did not want to see its 
economy fluctuate with the national one. Thus Ye Xuanping used whatever 
opportunities to ask the center for special treatments to Guangdong. He openly pled to 
Beijing to spare the province from the full force of the austerity measures at a press 
conference during the NPC session in March 1989 {wang kaiyi mian),^^^ and argued in 
September 1990 that the retrenchment program was not applicable in Guangdong”^ 
Lin Ruo also wrote a letter to Jiang, asking for more autonomy to Guangdong.^^^ The 
Provincial Party Committee also prepared a document stating the problems in executing 
the State Council Correspondence (1988) No. 25, but fmally the document was not 
submitted because the Party committee did not think it was a right time to voice different 
opinions when Beijing was so determined to impose the retrenchment measures”^ 
Worthy of notice, Guangdong leaders began to bargain with the center with the 
aid of mass media in this period, which had never been used before. Ye's plea at the 
press conference was an example, and his successor Zhu Senlin also pled Beijing for 
more favorable policies during the NPC session in 1992.^ ^^ When the special policies 
ofZhu Rongji), Tai Pei: China Times Publishing Co., 1998, pp. 119-23; Elizabeth Cheng, "Now it's bund 
aid," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 147, no. 11，15 March 1990, pp. 38-9. 
153 For example, see Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong 
zhengfu {Autonomous behavior of the provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and 
open era), p. 53. 
154 Lu Di, "Guangdong ruhe 'wang kai yi men，(How can Guangdong spare itself from central austerity)," 
Wide Angle Magazine, no. 204, September 1989, pp. 22-6. 
155 South China Morning Post, 1 June 1991, translated in FBIS-Chirm, p. 35. 
156 Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu 
{Autonomous behavior of the provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open 
era), p. 36. 
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were attacked, Lin Ruo published some articles in Qiushi and Nanfang Ribao^^^ to 
defend the reform policy in Guangdong.'^^ Even Ren Zhongyijoined this effort and 
published an article to defend the reform in Guangdong and call for the full 
implementation of the State Council Correspondence (1988) No. 2SJ^' 
Despite all this effort, the plea for favorable treatment from Beijing did not free 
Guangdong from observing those newly imposed central measures to cool its economy, 
ifthe effort was not completely ineffective/^^ To be sure, Guangdong still had some 
leeway in carrying out central pol ic ies^ Nonetheless the message was clear, that 
Guangdong had lost its effective access to the center as before 1989, and the bargaining 
power of Guangdong had considerably diminished. This may be further exemplified by 
the case of introducing the tax sharing system in the early 1990s. 
6.3.2 Introduction of tax-sharing system 
As is said before, Guangdong took advantages of the special policies, with the 
fiscal contract system as its core, granted by Beijing and had achieved rapid economic 
159 Lin Ruo, "Several points of understanding on developing the socialist commodity economy," Nanfang 
ribao, 11 March 1991; translated in FBIS-China, 20 March 1991, p. 35. 
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1991;translated in FBIS-China, 20 March 1991, p. 35. 
161 Ren Zhongyi, "Reform, opening up, and taking economic construction as center," Nanfang ribao, 12 
April 1991; translated in FBIS-China, 12 April 1991, pp. 54-5. 
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Government in the reform and open era), p. 53. 
From time to time Guangdongjust ignored the central call for slowing down and kept its economic 
growth at a fast speed. Even if what tumed out to be in Guangdong was different from the central goal, as 
long as the difference was not very negative, Beijing would rather not interfere. See Louis do Rosario, 
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development. Subsequently, the fiscal contract system and other decentralization 
measures were applied nation wide with promising result. But problems also surfaced 
after the practice of decentralization for a decadeJ^^ A most serious one is the 
diminishing central revenue and ever-increasing financial deficit.'^^ Seeing the problem, 
Li Peng intended to abolish the financial contract system based on lump-sum transfer in 
late 1990, but failed as most provincial leaders, including Guangdong's Ye Xuan Ping 
and Shanghai's Zhu Rongji, did not agree. !66 
Three years later, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee 
decided again to change the old financial arrangement, by substituting a new tax-sharing 
system for the old contract system.'^^ Again such change was opposed by most ofthe 
provinces,i68 and Guangdong was said to be the one who resisted the new tax program 
most fiercely. Unwillingly though, Guangdong had no means to spare itselffrom the 
y 
implementation of the central decision, and Lin Ruo and Zhu Senlin urged local leaders 
to be considerate of national interests and implement the tax reform]69 
164 For a briefintroduction, see Dong Fureng, "Jihuajingji yu shichangjingji zhong de zhongyang yu 
difang guanxi (Central-local relations in the plan and market economies)," Dong Fureng et. al., Jiquanyu 
fenquan: zhongyangyu difangguami de goujian {Centralization and decentralization: the construction of 
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6.3.3 Resisting “northerners”: the struggle of Guangdong leaders 
Since 1989, Guangdong has diverged from central intentions not only in 
numerous economic policies, but also in personnel arrangements. Beijing had started 
purging radical reformers soon after Zhao's downfall,"�and the attempt to reshuffle 
Guangdong leaders such as Lin and Ye took place since the fall ofl989.^^' A lot of 
rumors spread, and evidences did show that Beijing had planed to transfer Yuan Mu to 
t ^^ 
the province in early 1990. However, Guangdong effectively resisted the central 
effort, as Lin and Ye retained their post till 1991. Then they were respectively replaced 
by Xie Fei and Zhu Senlin, both developing their career in Guangdong. Another 
potential central take-over was in 1995, when Beijing considered sending Liao Hui, a 
1 nn 
Guangdong native but with central background, to replace Zhu Senlin. It tumed out 
that Zhu was succeeded by another Guangdong cadre, Lu Ruihua, in 1996. Besides, 
Beijing also had the plan of transferring Guangdong Party boss Xie Fei to the NPC as 
early as in 1995,^ ^^ but the plan did not become realized till 1998. 
Why were Guangdong leaders able to secure their posts to be filled by local 
candidates in this period? To a large degree this was because of the strong consensus 
among the local cadres that Guangdong should be ruled by Guangdong people,"，which 
had made Guangdong officials ready to discontent most ofBeijing's intention to appoint 
170 Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1989: the crisis of incomplete reform," Asian Survey, vol. XXX, no. 1, 
January 1990, pp. 25-41. 
171 See, for example, South China Morning Post, 2 September 1989. 
172 Ming Pao, 10 January 1990; 10 May 90; respectively translated in FBIS-China, 10 January 1990, p. 52 
and 11 May 1990, pp.58-9. 
� 3 Lien Ho Pao, 29 November 1994; translated in FBIS-China, 1 December 1994, p. 47; Sing tao daily, 
13 February 1995. 
174 HongKongStandard, 15 July 1995. 
175 According to interviewee 2, there had been a wide-spread rumor among Guangdong cadres that Ye 
Jianying and Deng Xiaoping had reached an oral agreement that Guangdong leaders should be chosen 
from Guangdong natives. 
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outsiders to head Guangdong. Before a decision is made about changing provincial 
leaders, the center will follow a certain procedure to consult the province concerned. 
For the post of provincial Party secretary, the opinions of the corresponding provincial 
Party committee will carry heavy weight, and for the post of governor, the opinions of 
the Party group of the provincial people's congress standing committee will also be 
counted.i76 When Beijing consulted Guangdong about Yuan Mu's transferal, however, 
the proposal "has sparked off strong opposition sentiment among the cadres in the 
province," which Beijing finally followed and appointed Xie as the new Party 
secretary.i77 Similarly, Beijing approved Guangdong's proposal to appoint Zhu Senlin 
as successor to Ye.^ ^^ It was clear that Beijing in this period did not intend to impose the 
full play of its leader transferal measures on Guangdong against most officials' will in 
the province, which was still economically strong. Besides, it was desirable that 
Guangdong did not changed too much in the period when Hong Kong was soon to be 
reverted to China]79 Xie Fei, for example, remained in his office till 1998. 
6.2.4 The coming of outsiders 
But this period did not last long. It was a shock to Guangdong that, despite its 
effort of lobbying Beijing hard to “steer clear of northerners," Wang Qishan, a protege 
of Premier Zhu Rongji, was transferred to the province as executive-vice governor in 
January 1998, and Li Changchun, Jiang Zemin's protege, replaced Xie to be the 
176 CCP, Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zhawcin tiaoli {Provisional regulation 
concerning recnuting leaders and cadres of the Party and government), 1995; the recruiting process 
before 1995 followed similar procedures. 
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provincial Party secretary in February.^^^ Clearly, local political elites failed to persuade 
Beijing to select a local cadre to head the province. This change has revealed that 
Guangdong has lost its privilege and preferential treatment in not only economic 
policies, but also personnel treatment. Although Li Changchun enjoyed good 
communication with Jiang, it was widely speculated that Li would embody more central 
control to Guangdong than fighting for the provincial interests in Beijing. It is also 
possible that Wang may replace Lu Ruihua if the latter fails to satisfy Beijing in 
1 o 1 
administering the province. 
6.4 Major findings 
Simply speaking, central-Guangdong political relations may be divided into two 
phases, that before 1989 and after 1989. In the early phase Guangdong leaders enjoyed 
easy access to the national decision-making arena, and gained a lot of authorities and 
favorable treatment which the province needed. In the later period, Guangdong could 
hardly gain favorable policies from Beijing despite its effort of plea for special 
treatment. A major cause for this change was the change of central leadership, and the 
accompanying change ofleaders' attitude and treatment to Guangdong. Consequently, 
central goals and provincial needs had been divergent. In this stage it may be conceived 
that an antagonistic relationship was developed between Guangdong and Beijing. The 
autonomy of Guangdong was reduced because the province could hardly get what it 
wanted without approval from Beijing. As a whole, Guangdong enjoyed less 
180 
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opportunities provided by the political arrangement in the later period, and political 
localism in the province diminished. 
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Chapter 7 The trend of change: strengths and implications 
The preceding chapters have revealed that opportunities for Guangdong political 
elites to shape local policies have been increasingly provided by the legal arrangement, 
while the political arrangement offered less such opportunities. In other words, 
Guangdong has experienced greater legal localism and less political localism. This 
pattern of change is compatible to the static pattem in the seven countries Page studies, 
that legal localism is paired with political centralism, or political localism paired with 
legal centralism. If the number of local legislation is considered as an indicator of legal 
localism, then legal localism in Guangdong increased most rapidly during the period of 
the Eighth PPCSC, from 1993 to early 1998. It was during the same period that political 
localism in Guangdong declined most rapidly. 
Why was the increase in legal localism associated with the decrease in political 
localism? Was this a mere coincidence, or a consequence that had its own course of 
development? To go one step further, what implications did this change have on the 
central-local relations in China? This chapter will concentrate on these questions. The 
first section will investigate the connection between legal localism and political localism 
in our Guangdong case, followed by a discussion of the implications of the changes on 
the institutionalization of central-local relations, and then the prospects of the central-
local relations in China. 
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7.1 The connection between legal and political locaiism 
This session discusses the connection between legal and political localism based 
011 three scenarios. The first views that the increase in legal localism resulted directly 
from the loss of political access to Beijing; the second scenario views that the increase in 
legal localism and the decrease in political localism were overwhelmingly a coincidence, 
and the third scenario views that there was partial connection between the changes in 
political and legal localism. 
7.1.1 Scenario I 
The first scenario that views the increase in legal localism as a direct 
consequence of the decrease in political localism is based on the assumption of the new 
right model that leaders tend to maximize the resources under their control.'^^ It is 
assumed that Guangdong provincial elites tried to maximize their autonomy. In the 
early 1980s, Guangdong leaders mightjust ask Beijing for what they needed, and most 
oftime this would be successful. Nevertheless Guangdong has been losing such 
opportunities since 1989. Alternatively, Guangdong leaders resort to the legal means to 
achieve the same goal. 
This scenario seemed very true when we consider the launch of the project of 
"ruling the province by law (yifa zhi sheng�.” According to one source, the project was 
suggested by a professor of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in early 1992, and got 
approval from Party Secretary Xie Fei in February,'^^ just months after Lin Ruo, Zhao 
Ziyang's old associate, stepped down from the position of the Provincial Party 
182 
For more details about the model, see William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy: servant or master, London: 
Institute ofEconomic Affairs, 1973. 
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ruling the province by law in guangdong)," Xueshu Yanjiii (Academic research), no. 12, 1997，pp. 32-6. 
75 
Secretary. The foremost component of the project is to strengthen the legislation 
concerning the economy, which, as discussed in Chapter 3, may grant substantial 
autonomy to the provincial government. In China, most of the local laws passed by the 
provincial legislature are proposed by the government. In 1996, for example, fourteen 
local laws out of twenty passed by Guangdong PPCSC and applied in the whole 
province were proposed by the provincial government.'^^ With consideration of the 
close connection between the legislature and government, it is not unreasonable that the 
leaders of Guangdong deliberately launched the project of ruling the province by law to 
advance provincial autonomy. 
Nevertheless a closer investigation into the process about the launching of the 
project suggests otherwise. The project of ruling the province by law was not the 
creation of Guangdong, and the origin of the project may date back to 1986 when Benxi 
city of Liaoning province launched the project of "ruling the city by law."'^^ According 
to an interviewee, the origin of the project was associated with propaganda and legal 
education (j)u fa xuanchuan) organized by the Judicial Ministry {sifa bu) in Beijing. 
More than one hundred places, including Qujiang County and Guangzhou Municipality 
in Guangdong, had organized similar activities.^^^ The proposal of the project by the 
professor of Zhongshan University was for the purpose of the legality construction. 
Most importantly, the comments on the proposal by Xie Fei, then Provincial Party 
Secretary of Guangdong, did not show special interest in the proposal.'^^ 
184 Ibid. Among the 33 laws passed by Guangdong PPCSC in 1996, 13 were applied in Guangzhou. See 
also Appendix I for reference. 
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Furthermore, it was the Guangdong PPCSC, and not the Provincial Party 
Committee or People's Government, that took most effort to push the project. The 
project was first mentioned formally in May 1993 when Xie Fei reported to the Seventh 
Party Congress of Guangdong Province, with one general sentence about the political 
reform touching the project.^^^ It was the Guangdong PPCSC that proposed to make 
Shenzhen as the experimental city for the project of ruling the city by law, and got 
approved from the Provincial Party Committee.'^^ The Party Committee, again, did not 
show special interest in another document about strengthening the work of ruling the 
province by law, while the PPCSC has organized several conferences about the project. 
As an interviewee comments, it is the Guangdong PPC that made the project out of one 
sentence by Xie Fe i .^ 
The project of ruling the province by law serves as a critical case in our 
investigation. If the provincial leaders, that is, the Party Secretary and Governor, had 
intended to employ legal means to advance their political interests, they should have 
taken every opportunity available, and should not have missed this project to advance 
their interest. Our investigation, however, did not show that any such special interest of 
the provincial leaders had got involved in the project. Therefore, at the least, the 
increase in legal localism shall not be regarded as merely a consequence of the loss of 
political opportunities. 
188 The sentence reads: "We must pay good attention to push political reform, build up democratic politics, 
and implement ruling the province by law." 
189 Zhang Fuqiang, "Gaige kaifang yu guangdong yi fa zhi sheng de shijian (Reform and the practice of 
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7./.2 Scenario 11 
Our second scenario views that legal localism and political localism had their 
respective courses of development. While the decrease of political localism in 
Guangdong resulted mainly from the change of central leadership, the development of 
legal localism rooted in leaders' effort to rebuild the socialist legality and the demand of 
the market economy. 
First, local legislation was associated with the emphasis of socialist democracy 
and legality. After the disastrous destruction during rounds of political struggles and 
particularly the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, the policy and slogan to "build up 
socialist democracy and legality" {jianshe shehui zhuyi minzhu yu fazhi) was formulated. 
As Deng has commented: 
In this period, we must particularly stress democracy, because 
democratic centralism had not really been carried out during a long period in 
the past, with too little democracy, with centralism without democracy.. . . 
To guarantee people's democracy, [we] must strengthen the rule of law. 
[We] must institutionalize and legalize the democratic system, lest this system 
and the law change as a result of leader changes, or of the changes of leaders' 
opinions and attention. The present problem is that the law system is very 
incomprehensive, with many laws still not available .... '^' 
Indeed, democracy and legality has not only attracted attention from many leaders, but 
also become a desirable outcome for many Chinese. 
Second, the reform and opening up of China required a set of laws as “rules of 
the game." As early as in the late 1970s, the request for the authority of economic 
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legislation was written into the report for special policies and flexible measures by the 
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, and had been mentioned by Gu Mu on several 
occasions before the report was drafted."2 xhe construction of market economy, which 
has become an official goal of China, attaches more importance to legislation. In the 
words ofTian Jiyun, the market economy is an "economy governed by law."'^^ In 
addition, strong andjust legal institutions are also required to cope with the by-products 
of the economic reform, such as the decline of social order and serious corruption. 
To be sure, there were some connections between political and legal localism. 
The authority Guangdong obtained to legislate for its SEZs, for example, was a part of 
the benefit gained in the political arena. Overwhelmingly, however, scenario II tends to 
view that the increase in legal localism and the decrease in political localism in 
Guangdong were a coincidence. 
A major defect of this scenario is that it cannot satisfactorily explain why there 
were so many local and departmental interests embodied in local legislation. If the 
development of local legislation resulted from people's respect to the rule oflaw and the 
demand of market economy, then local laws enacted should conform to the rules 
prescribed by national laws in governing local legislation. However, as is shown above, 
quite a number of local laws, such as the Shenzhen Land Administration Regulation, did 
not comply with central laws. Furthermore, many local legislation embodied local and 
departmental interests that impaired the development of market economy. Therefore, 
although scenario II suggests some reasons for the rapid increase of local legislation, it 
191 Deng Xiaoping, DengXiaoping wemuan (A collective of DengXiaoping's works), vol. 2, Beijing: 
Renmin Press, 1994, pp. 144-7. 
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does not seem true that the decrease in political localism and increase in legal localism 
were merely coincidence. 
7.1.3 Scenario HI 
Scenario III views that, besides the respective factors for the change of legal and 
political localism, the development of legal localism has close connection with political 
localism. The agent of such connection is various interests of the localities, departments 
and the system of people's congress. 
Simultaneous advancement of legal and political localism 
Two chapters above have shown that both political and legal localism were 
ascending in Guangdong during the first phase of the reform by 1989. As soon as the 
special policies, particularly the financial contract arrangement, were granted to 
Guangdong, the interest of the province had become prominent. Leaders and people in 
Guangdong were motivated to generate as much production and income as possible, for 
they knew they might keep a good part of what they produced. Enjoying good 
communication with Beijing, Guangdong leaders also dared to demand and bargain 
intensively with central leaders for more resources for local development. Departmental 
interests of various government agencies were in the forming stage, and were not 
prominent vis-a-vis the provincial interest. 
At this stage the development of local legislation was closely associated with the 
whole reform process, and might be regarded as a component of the whole 
decentralization program decided in the political arena. The legislation power for the 
SEZs by Guangdong and Fujian PPCs and their standing committees, for example, was 
193 "Tian Jiyun calls for economy-related legislation," FBIS Daily Report — China (FBIS hereafter), 3 
January 1995. 
80 
particularly granted by the NPCSC in 1981 for the sake ofthe SEZs.'^^ When a new law 
was made, provincial leaders might claim credit for it and ask Beijing for more support. 
In short, at this early period, politicians and legislature were reinforcing each other in 
advancing and protecting local interests. 
Departmental interests and local legislation 
The reform process was temporarily stopped after the bloodshed ofl989. 
Central leaders supportive to Guangdong were gone, and economic retrenchment was 
adopted. The strong central leadership under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji had made 
Guangdong difficult to obtain more favorable treatment and other resources from 
Beijing, and Guangdong leaders' bargaining was most of time fruitless. However, after 
ten years of reform the province's economy and society have become diversified and 
pluralist, and interests of various agencies have taken root in association with different 
sectors of the economy and society. As law was playing more important role in state 
and society, these agencies, especially the government departments, had leamed how to 
use local legislation to express and protect their interests. Many provinces have enacted 
local laws which are out of the scope of their legislative authority, or repeatedly enact 
local laws that embody departmental interests.'^^ As a result, local legislation has 
become an arena for government agencies to fight for their interests. 
Institutional interest of the legislature 
When legislation has become an arena for the fighting of interests, legal and 
political leaders have to be concerned with controlling the legislation and legislature. If 
194 "Resolution of the NPCSC concerning the authorization of the People's Congresses and their Standing 
Committees of Guangdong Province and Fujian Province to make various specific economic regulations 
of their respective SEZs." 
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the control is successful, the legislature may be of great help when they intend to issue 
new policies. There are two likely patterns concerning the control oflegislation. One 
option is that the PPCSC has firm control over legislation. Sichuan PPCSC, for 
example, retains the authority of drafting local laws involving multiple government 
agencies, and therefore helps to produce a fair bill by reducing the potential conflicts 
1 0/C 
resulting from partial departmental interests. 
The other pattem is that the executive branch plays a more important part in 
legislation than the legislature. If a legislation is drafted by government agencies, the 
coordination procedure designed for making consensus among departments involved is 
essential. When the government proposes a bill to the legislature, the provincial legal 
system bureau ifazhiju) will first consult the departments concerned. If any of them 
disagree, the legal system bureau will explain to the departments or have the draft 
revised so as to get the consensus within the government itself. As a result, the 
legislation proposed by the government rarely fails. Occasionally the coordination may 
encounter difficulty, and the legislature will be ofhelp if the government cooperates 
well. 
The case of the property registration regulation may illustrate this point. When 
the Legal System Bureau proposed the property registration regulation to Guangdong 
PPCSC, the coordination was not carried through within the government. The head of 
the Land Department, Yuan Zheng, was said a strong hand in the government, and did 
195 Liu Hailiang et. al. (eds.), Zhongguo difang fazhijianshe (The construction of local legal system in 
China), pp. 211-2. 
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not give consent to the bill. '^ ^ It is not yet clear whether or not the provincial 
government put this immature bill forward to the PPCSC deliberately. When the 
Department issued the two telegrams in open defiance with the newly enacted regulation 
and the PPCSC appeared incensed and fiercely criticized the Department for its 
198 
defiance, the provincial leaders appeared very supportive to the legislature. The fact 
is, the PPCSC did function well in launching the bill into operation, and the legislature 
had in effect helped the government to finish the difficult coordination task. 
The politics concerning the legislature becomes more complex when national 
politicians intend to build up their power basis by making use ofthe legislature. For 
example, evidences have shown that the rapid development of local legislation from 
1993 to 1998 was associated with the faction politics in the center. After Qiao Shi and 
Tian Jiyun headed the Eighth NPC in 1993, the “faction of the people's congress" 
{renda pai) had been apparent. They eagerly boosted the role of the legislature as a 
means to challenge the dominant political force with Jiang Zemin as its core. The 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service — China Daily Report had recorded 40 speeches 
by the two leaders to call for speeding up legislation and upholding the work ofthe 
people's congresses at all levels in the period from March 1993 to June 1996. Such 
struggle surfaced after Deng's death in early 1997, and it was reported that Qiao had 
contested for the position as Deng's heir.^ ^^ The competition between the two factions 
197 According to interviewee 3, Yuan Zheng had been considered to be promoted as vice-governor of 
Guangdong before this case happened. 
198 It was the Provincial Government that issued the notice to revoke the telegrams by the Provincial State 
Land Department, according to interview 3. 
199 South China Morning Post, 2 April 1997. 
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became more intensified around the days when the Fifteenth Party Congress and the 
Ninth NPC session were hold.^ 
As a result of all the factors discussed above, the people's congress has gained a 
seat in the power structure among major state and party organs, and legal localism 
gained its momentum from various kinds of interests, be it local, departmental or 
personal. These interests took root in the earlier reform process which was determined 
in the intensive bargaining in the political arena. Therefore, the increase in legal 
localism might be conceived as an indirect consequence ofpolitical localism. The 
advancement of legal localism, however, did not contribute directly to political localism, 
since the communication between the provincial leaders and central politicians did not 
increase, nor became easier, with a larger number of local legislation. 
In short, scenario III views that there is a complex relationship between legal and 
political localism. Under due conditions political and legal localism may positively 
interact with each other, and under other conditions there may be only one-way, indirect 
connection between the two. As a whole, this scenario fails to generate a single pattem 
in regard of the interaction between political and legal localism based on two decades of 
experience of Guangdong. 
7,L4 Some observations 
Before going further, some observations concerning the development of political 
and legal localism may be made. First, it is clear that there were separate causes for the 
development of legal localism and political localism. Causes for the former included 
people's desire for rule oflaw and the requirement of the market economy, and, for the 
200 South China Morning Post, 2 July 1997; 20 September 1997; 3 October 1997; 3 December 1997. 
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later, the specific conditions in Guangdong and central leaders' specific interest in the 
province. 
Second, the interaction between legal and political localism depends on 
appropriate conditions. In some situation the two types of localism may interact and 
reinforce each other, while in other situation their connection may be vague. In 
Guangdong, the development legal localism has shown greater strength than political 
localism. This was manifest in the fact that when political localism was diminishing in 
Guangdong after 1989, legal localism was able to rebound from the recession around the 
1989 crisis. 
Finally, probably a central and common factor behind the two localism is the 
existence of local and departmental interests. Either the legislature or politicians may be 
activated for the sake of these interests, but political localism appears more vulnerable as 
it has to involve central politicians who are outside of the province. Comparatively 
speaking, legal localism is more stable and able to cater to local needs. 
As will be shown in the following sessions, such a development course of legal 
and political localism will produce significant implications for Guangdong and the 
central-local relations in China. 
7.2 Implications on institutionalization 
7.2.1 Definition of institutionalization 
Institution is an important concept in social sciences, nevertheless its meaning 
has been diversified. This study adopts a sociological definition of institution, that is，an 
organized system of social relationships which embodies certain common values and 
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procedures ami meets certain needs.^^' Based on this, institutionalization takes place 
when a regular system of statuses, roles and procedures is developed, and such statuses, 
^ f \ ^ 
roles and procedures are generally accepted in society. It can be seen that two 
essential conditions for institutionalization are 1.) a regular arrangement with a set of 
clear statuses, roles and procedures, and 2.) the general acceptance ofthe arrangement. 
7.2.2 The lack of institutionalization in Chinese central-local relations 
Evidences suggest that the central-local relations in China are highly 
uninstitutionalized. First of all, although the Constitution and the Local Organic Law 
grant a wide range of authorities to the local government on the principle of omni-
competence, to what extent local affairs can be determined locally is not clear. It can 
only be inferred that in areas where central directive is absent, local government may 
exercise a high degree of self-determination. There have been laws that specify some 
division of power between the central and local governments, nevertheless the 
specifications are vague, especially when compared with that in the developed countries. 
As a result, a clear role expected for local government or central government or their 
agencies is largely absent in law. 
Second, the unclear specification of the authorities of local government leaves 
large room for the executive branch and other actors to finalize. Too many important 
arrangements concerning central-provincial relations are determined politically. Worst 
of all, if the legal arrangement does not solve the problem of institutionalization, neither 
can the political arrangement. 
201 Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, Sociology，6'^ ed, Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1984, p. 212. 
202 ibid., p. 214. 
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A decision by the CCPCC and State Council may give a province tremendous 
power, may take back authorities from the province, or may impose a new tax system 
which has great impacts on local government. Guangdong, from its pre-1978 status as a 
neglected province in economy, through the rapid rise of the province not only 
economically but also politically in the 1980s, to the latest round of northern “takeover” 
in the late 1990s, has undergone a complete cycle in terms of central patronage in twenty 
years. While in the earliest period Guangdong enjoyed good communication with 
Beijing and was able to seek favorable treatments easily, in the later period Guangdong 
seemed to fail to achieve major positive results in bargaining with Beijing, due largely to 
the change of central leadership and the subsequent loss of access from Guangdong to 
the center. Clearly, the political arrangement of central-provincial relations is highly 
unstable. 
Indeed, the division of power between the center and locality, on the political 
scale, is based on intense bargaining of the two sides, which can hardly be stabilized. 
Such division of power, in addition, has no identical pattern, and varies from province to 
province. Leaders from rich coastal provinces such as Shandong and Shanghai may 
• • 203 
often secure their seats in the Politburo, enjoying more ready access to the center. 
Those leaders in the interior provinces may have little say in the decisional core. Worst 
of all, even if the access is available, the bargaining is successful, and the central 
203 Party secretaries from Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Shanghai, Guangdong often occupy a position in the 
Politburo. In the 1987 Politburo, such members included Jiang Zemin (Shanghai), Li Ruihuan (Tianjin), 
Li Ximing (Beijing), and Yang Rudai (Sichuan); in 1992, Wu Bangguo (Shanghai), Chen Xitong 
(Beijing), Jiang Chunyun (Shandong), Xie Fei (Guangdong), and Tan Shaowen (Fujian); in 1997, Li 
Changchun (Henan and later Guangdong), Wu Guanzheng (Tianjin), Jia Qinglin (Beijing), Huang Ju 
(Shanghai), and Xie Fei (Guangdong). For sources, see Table 6. 
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documents are issued, central ministries and provincial authorities mayjust simply 
ignore these central documents or instructions. 
When a set of clear and stable status and procedure in the central-local relations 
is absent, the arrangement is hardly accepted by the public. The popular saying ofyi 
shou jiu si, yifang jiu luan (once the economy was centralized, the economy became 
lifeless; once decentralized, the economy became uncontrollable) expressed 
dissatisfaction among the public. 
1.2.3) Institutionalization and Guangdong 
Nevertheless evidences have shown that Guangdong has been escaping this 
highly uninstitutionalized pattern. If the new authorities and special policies of 
Guangdong before 1989 were mainly the result of the bargaining between Guangdong 
and central leaders, then after 1989 such authorities came mainly with the rise of legal 
localism. Many functions and discretion of the provincial government have been 
prescribed by laws, especially by local legislation that has increased substantially in 
quantity. For the reasons that the promulgation and revocation of law must follow strict 
legal procedures, that the provisions of law are clear and explicit, and that the 
enforcement of law is backed by thejudicial branch, the autonomy of the province has 
become institutionalized to a considerable degree. 
It is expected that such a trend of change will continue in the foreseeable future. 
The development of legal localism in Guangdong has shown great strength in the past 
two decades, and is almost unstoppable even without the backing of political localism.^^^ 
People's desire for rule of law, the development of market economy, and the emergence 
204 The only recess in legal localism was the period of the Tian'anmen Crisis, which disturbed the nation 
in almost every aspect. 
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oflocal and departmental interests, all have taken root in state and society, and all 
demand further development of local legislation and legal localism. 
Problems in the current institutionalization process 
To be sure, there are still many problems in the current stage of legal 
development. While local legislation must reflect local interests, excessive parochial 
and departmental interests may disturb the long term development of the legal system. 
As to the Guangdong property registration regulation of 1994, lawyers have complaint 
shall the national law or the provincial law be followed if there is a dispute or 
suitcase?205 Another potential factor that may affect the development of legislation is 
the faction politics. If it is Qiao Shi and his protege who boosted the legislation to a 
record stage, then what would be after Qiao stepped down? Although concrete 
evidences are not available, Li Peng, who succeeded Qiao as chairman of the NPCSC, 
appears not as eager as Qiao to promote the legislation work and the status of the 
people's congress. His only major speech since his heading the national legislature was 
to stress "Party ranks above the NPC."^^^ It is quite likely that this will result in sluggish 
legislation and a bound legislature which is not able to control its own development 
course. 
The disturbance to the legal system implies that the degree of institutionalization 
is still limited. Too much politics is involved in the legal practice, and the legislature is 
still in a weak and dependent position vis-a-vis the Party and government organs. 
205 FBJS-China, 19 January 1995, pp. 71-3. 
206 See South China Morning Post, 30 April 1998. 
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Scholarly comments and suggestions 
ln view ofthe existing problems, numerous scholars in Guangdong have 
contributed their opinions on the development of the legal system. In the running ofthe 
tax sharing system, for example, a Guangdong scholar has complained that it is not fair 
that the division of fiscal power between the central and local governments is regulated 
by documents of the State Council, which systematically favor the center. It is therefore 
suggested that the distribution of power between the central and local governments 
should be defined by the NPC, and local people's congresses should have the authority 
^ r \ n 
to decide a part of the local taxation." 
Despite this, many scholars have noticed that the legislation in China has become 
increasingly specialized and professionalized, and the party control over law making has 
been loosening.^^^ Some Guangdong scholars have further called for the establishment 
of a Provincial Law Center by Guangdong PPC, Provincial Legal System Department 
(fazhiju), provincial law school, departments of law in universities, and other people of 
the field so as to improve the quality of law making and law implementation.^^^ In the 
transplantation of foreign laws, some Guangdong scholars even argue for a breakthrough 
2�7 Yang Weihua, "Zhongguo fenshuizhi yunxing de chengxiao�wenti yu duice (Achievements, problems, 
and solutions in running the tax sharing system in China).” 
208 Murray Scot Tanner, "The erosion of communist party control over lawmaking in China," China 
Quarterly, no. 138, June 1994, pp. 381-403; Edward J. Epstein, "Law and legitimation in post-Mao 
China," Pitman B. Potter (ed.), Domestic law reforms in post-Mao China, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, 
pp. 19-54. 
209 Wu Shihuan, Yang Jianguang, "Cong shinian lai Guangdong Sheng gaige kaifang de shijian kan 
zhuyi faxue de xin fazhan (New development of Marxistjurisprudence in the perspective of the practice 
of Guangdong's reform and opening in the past ten years),，’ Zhongshan Daxue Xuebao, no. 4, 1988, pp. 
14-17. 
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of the socialist law system based on the idea of "one country, two systems,” and finally 
• 2 I Q 
the Chinese law system shall be converged into the international standard. 
7.3 Legal localism: a desirable outcome 
For the establishment of a reasonable and firmly institutionalized division of 
power between the center and provinces, this paper suggests legal localism as a desirable 
pattem for China's central-local relationship. The following will first compare major 
features of legal localism and political localism, and then discuss their implications with 
the conditions in China. 
7.J. 1 Major features ofpolitical localism and legal localism 
Leadership style 
Based on the well-developed Anglo-French comparative literature, one may 
^ 1 1  
conclude that the role of the French mayor is primarily a “policy broker." Thus, a 
mayor in France is to negotiate, bargain, or otherwise attract scarce resources such as 
money and legal power. In Page's words, "success under political localism is a function 
�1 0 
of the ability to bring in benefits from the outside." Indeed, "political localism 
involves the manipulation of desired local political resources to extract benefits from 
，1 ^  
national political actors." Under such a system, local officials' power and legitimacy 
is based on their access to the institutions higher up, especially the national political 
21�Jiang Qijiang, "Yiguo liangzhi yu shehui zhuyi shichangjingji fazhijianshe ruogan wenti de sikao" 
(Some considerations on one country two system and the legality construction of socialist market 
economy), Guangdong shehui kexue, no. 1, 1997, pp.117-22. ,1 1 
“ E d w a r d C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 71. 
212 Ibid., p. 70. See also S. Tarrow, Between center and periphery: grassroots politicians in Italy and 
France, New Heaven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977. 
213 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 72. 
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figures. Furthermore, the political resources for these local political leaders are 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of these individuals. 
On the other hand, the key role ofbrokerage for local political elites is largely 
absent in the context of legal localism. Local polity with legal localism is marked by 
well-developed functional specialization, professionalism, and bureaucratization.^ ‘ ^  The 
leadership in Britain is collegial in nature, and the involvement of politicians in decision 
making, of either routine or new policy, takes place in functional committees. The 
power and legitimacy of British local elites are based on their ability to control and 
manage organizations structured on hierarchical lines, and on their ability to make use of 
local resources. To use Page's metaphor, if the mayor in France is to broke, its British 
counterpart is to "run the business.,，�!）Since most decisions are made locally without 
involving outsider or national political forces, policies of the local government usually 
/^  1 r 
reflect more local preferences and innovation. 
Professionalism and the bureaucracy 
In countries with greater legal localism exist powerful bureaucracies and 
professional groups. In Britain, local bureaucrats with expertise enjoy high status. 
Bodies like the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, the Royal Town 
Planning Institute, and the Institute of Housing grant qualifications to senior officials in 
their respective areas. Many independent committees or quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations (QUANGOs), such as the National Health Service, obtain 
214 ibid.,p.71. 
2�5 ibid., p. 70. 
216 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, "The city in the future of democracy," American political science 
review, vol. 67, 1961, pp. 953-70; J D. Stewart, Local government: the conditions of local choice, London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1983; LJ. Sharpe, "Theories and values of local government," Political studies, vol. 18, 
no. 2, 1970, pp. 153-74. 
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substantial power from national and local governments, and handle a wide scope of 
business without government i n t e r f e r e n c e ? " Indeed many important policies are made 
within such bodies. Senior employment in local government is offered to professionals 
such as legal practitioners, who often fill the top management positions of local 
government, such as the town clerk or chief executive. The national organizations of 
local government officials are also regularly consulted by the national government on 
218 
such matters as technical problems, and their working conditions and pay. Indeed, 
bureaucrats and professionals are so strong in Britain that even elected political elites 
have to rely on them for advice in a wide range of affairs.^'^ 
In contrast, the professional groups and bureaucrats enjoy a far lower status in 
the countries where legal localism is absent. In France it is the Interior Ministry and the 
Ministry of Economy and Finances that determine the qualification and pay for local 
government officials, and have kept communes from creating certain sorts of senior 
posts that would otherwise attract high fliers into local government employment.^^^ In 
Italy, evidences also show that local government officials have a relatively low degree of 
professionalization in terms of their expertise and their ability regulate entry to their 
99 1 
profession. 
217 For more details about the QUANGOs, see John Kingdom, Government and politics in Britain, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 441-477. 
218 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of local self-
government, p. 72. 
219 There has been constant debate about who actually run Britain, the ministers or the bureaucrats in 
White Hall. See John Kingdom, Government and politics in Britain, pp. 369-75. 
220 F. Dreyfus and F. d'Arcy, Les institutions politiques et administratives de la France, Paris: Economica, 
1985, p. 349, cited in Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of 
local self-government, p. 77. 
" ' P . F. Furlong, "policy elites and public administration in Italy," paper prepared for the European 
Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Rimini, 1988, cited in Edward C. Page, Localism and 
centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-government, p. 77. 
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Citizens, participation 
The pattern of localism also has implications on political participation by 
citizens. Not directly proven though, it is expected that higher level of participation 
exists in countries where there is greater legal localism. This is not only because local 
government under legal localism usually has wider range of functions, but also because 
local authorities have more discretion in determining their own affairs without involving 
authorities outside or at higher levels. Citizen's participation also exists in multiple 
forms because of the pluralist authority structure within the state under legal localism. 
Citizens may directly communicate with government bureaucracy and professional 
groups, in addition to the elected government officials. 
Almond and Verba's study about the political culture in five nations provides an 
indirect proof for higher level of participation in countries under legal localism. 
Evidences support their thesis that, generally speaking, ‘‘the extent to which the local 
government is open to citizen participation in decisions would be closely related to the 
00， • extent of local autonomy." While 39 percent of the correspondents in Britain - which 
represents legal localism - say that "ordinary man should be active in his community," 
only 10 percent of the correspondents in Italy — which represents political localism -
902 
hold the same idea. Also, 21 percent of the respondents in Britain say that they "have 
attempted to influence local government,” while only 9 percent of the correspondents in 
，，zl 
Italy say the same. 
222 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five 
nations, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 168. 
223 ibid., p. 169. 
224 Calculated from Table 3 in ibid., p. 188. 
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Table 7 Some characters of the two types of local politics 
Legal local ism Polit ical localism  
Role of political Giving direction to a welfare Mobilizing political support 
leadership bureaucracy 
Business of the Making decisions about priorities Maintaining a traditional range of 
government from a wide range of functions local services such as culture and 
public health; developing public 
woks; attracting industry and 
investment 
Individualistic nature Collegial leadership Role of powerful individuals 
of leadership 
Political skill Good and sound management Entrepreneurship and skill in 
emphasized negotiation 
Benefit distribution Universalistic distribution of Particularistic benefits 
benefits 
Local identification Few appeals to the identification Basic local loyalties can be 
with the locality invoked  
Source: Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases of 
local self-government, p. 146. 
Regime stability 
Apart from the above characters, it is also apparent that political regimes with 
legal localism tend to be more stable. The main reason for this is that authorities to 
administer the state and society under legal localism are deconcentrated into hands of 
many individuals and independent or semi-independent organizations. Thus it is 
extremely difficult for any individual person or unit to produce uncontrollable courses. 
Major actions that may produce significant impacts on the state or society have to be 
deliberated and decided collectively by different people and units, and through this 
process no actions can be carried through unless they are well accepted by the majority 
of authorities, which actually make up a polity microcosm. At the same time as 
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authorities are delegated into different bodies, the regime under legal localism also 
diffuses the risk ofthe strong and unexpected hits. 
Such stability of the regime is manifest, as in the fact that the kingdom in Britain, 
originating during the pre-state period when Anglo-Saxons came to the island, has been 
kept for more than ten centuries since England was united. The United States, a country 
values "home rule" and presents many characteristics of legal localism, is able to keep 
its Constitution valid since its independence in the late 18^ ^ century. Other countries 
with less legal localism, such as Scandinavian countries Norway and Sweden, also have 
quite stable governments. This strongly contrasts with that in countries under political 
localism. Since the First French Republic was established in 1792, there have been five 
republics to date, with four already gone. Italy, another country under political localism, 
is probably the most tumultuous and unstable regime in the world, with more than fifty 
governments that have come and gone since 1946. 
73.2 Implications on institutionalization 
Legal localism also bears positive implications on institutionalization. As is 
discussed above, institutionalization requires clear status, role and procedure concerning 
the actors and their activities in the central-local arrangement, and the general 
acceptance of such stoups, role and procedure by the public. Based on this one can tell 
the difference of the degree to which such arrangement is institutionalized. 
Arrangements based on legal localism clearly present a more explicit system of 
opportunities for local political elites to employ. On the other hand, arrangements based 
on political localism often involve national political actors and intensive bargaining 
among them, and thus tend to be particularistic and unstable. 
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A more important indicator of institutionalization is the acceptance ofthe public. 
While surveys ofpublic opinions on the practice under different patterns oflocalism is 
not available, the degree of acceptance can be roughly estimated based on the comments 
and opinions expressed in the literature. For example, the idiom “yifangjiu luan, yi 
shou jiu si (once decentralized, the economy is uncontrollable; once centralized, 
lifeless)” reflects popular discontent among the Chinese people about the 
uninstitutionalized central-local relations in China. Such kind of criticism also exists in 
Western democracies. Banfield and Wilson, for example, dislike the local government 
based on political localism, and regarded such arrangement is essentially a system of 
"organized bribery" because the politicians' legitimacy is based on “specific material 
inducements" from outside the locality.^^^ It is also found that citizens in countries 
where there is political localism tend to be more individualistic and apathetic to politics. 
In Almond and Verba's study, 46 percent of the British respondents reply that they are 
proud of their governmental and political institution, while only 3 percent ofthe Italian 
correspondents hold the same opinion.^^^ Similar to that in Italy, citizen's distrust ofthe 
• • • 227 
state and its agencies is also apparent in France. 
In short, it is reasonable to view that legal localism offers more institutionalized 
basis for the autonomy of local government and central-local relations in the nation. 
225 Edward C. Banfield and James W. Wilson, City politics. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1963,p. 125. 
226 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five 
nations, p. 102. 
227 Roy C. Macridis (eds.), Modern political systems: Europe, 5'^  ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1983,p. 86. 
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7.3.3 Desirability ofl egal localism 
As the above comparisons reveal, legal localism presents more desirable 
characteristics suitable for China than political localism. True, there is no objective 
answer as to which pattern oflocalism is better or worse. Either legal localism or 
political localism works well in respective countries, and whether one likes it or not 
depends on personal preferences and values. 
The specific conditions in China, however, suggest preferences that fit the 
nation. Above all, China is hunger for institutionalization in its central-local relations so 
that the leaders ofboth the central and local governments may act according to the 
clearly-defined authorities. China has experienced centralism too long and too strong, 
and suffered too much from over-concentration of power on one or a few individuals 
and on the Party. China has been lacking in professionalism, and the regularity and 
efficacy of the government bureaucracy is far from satisfactory. China still awaits an 
active, voluntary, yet positive citizen participation over a wide range of state and 
community affairs. China needs a stable regime under which its economy and civil 
society can secure long term development. 
It is on this basis that legal localism, with its possible accompanies such as 
institutionalization, high degree of local autonomy, pluralism, professionalism, and 
stable regime, becomes a desirable goal for the direction of central-local arrangement in 
China. 
7.3.4 The course towards legal localism 
Then, is it likely for China to develop a system of legal localism? The earlier 
sessions have shown that Guangdong is moving in this direction, as legal localism has 
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been increasing with great strength. As a whole, as long as China is still building up its 
market economy and not going back to the command economy as before 1978, the 
demand for a comprehensive and strict legal system will remain strong, and the local 
interests will remain present. Under such circumstances, legislation at either the central 
or provincial level can only keep going forward, slow or fast, and this robust 
development of legislation will supply positive supports for legal localism. 
On the other hand, there are also obstacles in the way towards legal localism. 
Legal localism implies that the central-local division of power must be governed by law, 
and, more importantly, the rule of law must be respected and followed. But the record 
of rule of law in China is extremely poor and unsatisfactory, if it is not completely 
absent at all. Too often law was substituted for oral dictations of the emperors or high 
officials. This situation does not change very much even today, as reflected in the 
popular saying that “hongtou huru heitou, heitou buru koutou (law is not as authoritative 
as government policy, government policy is not as authoritative as leaders' oral 
instructions).” A more deep-rooted obstacle is the lack of legal culture for centuries in 
Chinese leaders and grass-root people. Many of Chinese traditional values contributed 
• • » 228 to the underdevelopment of elements for a strong andjust legal system in China. 
Today, many national leaders and government departments still make use oflaw to fight 
^ ^ Q 
for their own interests. Shall it be rule of law or rule by law? Will people resort to 
228 Qian Hongyou, "Xifang fazhijingshen he zhongguo fazhi zhi lu (The spirit of the rule oflaw in the 
West and the way to rule oflaw in China)," Zhongwaifaxne {Peking University law journaP), No. 6 1995, 
pp. 24-9; Gong peixiang, "Zhongguo fazhi xiandaihua mianlin de si da maodun (Four great contradictions 
confronting the modernization of the legal system in China),” Tansuo yu zhengmin {Probe and contend), 
no.3, 1995,pp.3-6. 
229 This is a theme in the discussion of the meaning of"ruling the state by law." Rule of law puts law into 
a higher status than rule by law, which regards law as a means to an end. See, Zhou Yongkun, "Yi fa 
zhiguojianshe shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia lilun yantaohui shupin, (A review of the theoretical conference on 
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legal procedure even ifthe procedure is expected to be lengthy and costly? IfChinese 
people do not have appropriate stand and commitment for these questions, legal localism 
will not be complete, nor will it be reliable. 
Legal localism also implies that, more fundamentally, the interests oflocalities 
must be recognized and the center must be willing to grant corresponding autonomy to 
the localities so that they can act according to local preferences. Local rule and 
autonomy is highly respected in Western democracies as it is rooted in the rise of 
municipalities or city-states in the Medieval era. In contrast, China has been a centralist 
country since its unification more than two thousand years ago, and is still a party state 
based on “democratic centralism." Thus local political elites are not locally rooted: they 
are appointed by the Party, and their promotion and rotation is determined at the higher 
level of authority instead of at the local community. Furthermore, the localities and 
people are overshadowed by the state in China. They are often called to fight for the 
prosperity of the state, and sacrifice themselves for the state. This relates to the question 
we put forward in the very beginning of this thesis: what is the position ofthe localities 
and local government in the state? We have to resort to the basic democratic theory for 
this question, that the state exists to serve its people, and that the state exists because its 
people think they may live a better life than without the state. It is unreasonable and 
absurd that people and localities shall sacrifice themselves for the state that is to serve 
them. Unfortunately, this very basic idea of democracy has not yet taken root in China. 
Although China has been moving in the right direction of legal localism, the final 
reaching of the end is indeed a long-term goal, with consideration of all the political, 
building up rule oflaw in a socialist country by ‘ruling the state by law')," Fazhiyu shehuifazhan {Law 
and social development), 1997, no. 2, pp. 11-9. 
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economic and cultural factors. To borrow Liibman's words, ‘‘Chinese accomplishments 
,,230 
so far amount only to a first step in what promises to be a very longjourney.” 
2如 Stanley Lubman, "Introduction: the future or Chinese law," China Quarterly, no. 141, March 1995, pp. 
1-21. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the opportunities available for provincial elites in China 
to shape local policies based on the two scales developed by Mackenzie and Page. 
Particularly, the study focuses on Guangdong for more insights and for the longitudinal 
change ofthe central-provincial relations. When applicable, comparisons with the 
developed Western countries are made so as to assess the degree oflocalism and reveal 
the characteristics in the arrangements of central-local relations in China. 
8.1 Legal centralism and political localism 
The pattern ofthe arrangement ofcentral-provincial relations in China lies 
broadly in the category oflegal centralism and political localism. In other words, while 
the legal framework has given the central government overwhelming power over the 
localities, provincial political elites may still acquire substantial opportunities in shaping 
local policies by influencing national decisions that affect the provinces. There exists 
the mechanism of"playing to the province,” which secures that the central leaders must 
pay special attention to and help the provinces. This is similar to that in France and 
Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain. Page has suggested that the two 
patterns oflocalism correspond to two types oflocal politics, whose major 
characteristics are summarized in Table 7 (p. 93). It can be seen that local politics in 
China possesses almost all the characteristics of political localism except for the role of 
political leadership, due to the lack of democratic election in China. 
102 
Indeed, China has many of its unique characters. Above all, most of its 
provinces are ‘‘the size and scale ofaEuropean country in population, land area and 
social complexity.,,23i 八呂 a result, in many aspects the degree of localism in China is 
greater than those European countries. In France, a design of swimming pool must 
obtain ministerial a p p r o v a l , while in China a project involving millions ofU.S. dollars 
may be decided within the province as long as it does not affect other provinces or the 
nation. It appears not very central even in the legal arrangement, with the consideration 
ofthe fact that provincial-level people's congresses are entitled to enact laws that are 
congruent with the central laws and regulations to be applied within the jurisdiction. 
However, this degree oflocalness is incomparable to that in countries under legal 
localism. Local government in Britain, for example, may decide how to mn education in 
its jurisdiction, while in China this must follow the national Education Law. 
8.2 The lack of institutionalization 
While substantial opportunities exist for local authorities to shape local policies, 
such opportunities are not well institutionalized. This becomes a critical problem in 
China's central-local relations. In the first place, the majority of Chinese laws and legal 
documents do not provide precise specification for the distribution offunctions and 
discretion between different levels of government. Probably a more serious problem is 
that some public services are not even governed by law simply because the 
corresponding laws are not available. The vaguely defined provisions in law leave a 
231 David S G Goodman, "China in reform: the view from provinces," David S.G. Goodman (ed.), 
China'sprovinces in reform: class, community andpolitical culture, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 1-15. 
，工 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, p. 70. 
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great room for the politicians and the executive branch to maneuver. However, in the 
second place, the behaviors and activities ofthe political leaders are hardly 
institutionalized neither. Too much are the central-provincial relations based on 
bargaining between the political leaders and on particular contracting. Finally, even if 
some agreements concerning central-provincial relations have been reached, or laws and 
legal documents have been promulgated to regulate such relations, many of them may 
just be ignored or only carried out in the way as the provinces, or even the central 
ministries please. 
8.3 The change and prospects 
However, the experience ofGuangdong has demonstrated that the province is 
undergoing a process towards greater legal localism, and the autonomy ofthe province 
has become institutionalized to a considerable degree as many functions and discretion 
oflocal government have been prescribed in law rather than political decisions. The 
development oflegal localism, which is rooted in people's review ofmore than 40 
years' institutional history ofthe People's Republic and various kinds ofinterests 
generated in two decades ofreform, is robust regardless of the diminishing political 
localism in Guangdong after 1989. With the vigorous legislative activities at the central 
and provincial levels, more and more opportunities for local political elites to shape 
local politics will be based on law. This is a positive indication because this study 
regards legal localism as a more desirable pattern than political localism. Above all, 
legal localism represents a more institutionalized arrangement between the center and 
localities in terms ofthe universalistic distribution ofbenefits and the explicit 
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specification ofthe respective functions and discretion of the central and local 
governments. 
Worthy ofpointing out, not only Guangdong, but many other provinces, saw a 
boost oflocal legislative activities in the past two decades. However, what has been 
achieved so far is remarkably different from that in Western democracies. Law is still 
conceived and made use ofby many people as a means to achieve what they desire. 
Local autonomy and home rule has not taken root in people's mind and is not 
sufficiently respected. Therefore, while greater legal localism will be the likely future, 
whether or not China may reach this end is still constrained by several critical factors, 
including the respect for legality, and the respect for local interests and autonomy. 
Clearly, these factors are largely ofattitudes and values, and it is these attitudes and 
values that have been absent in the long history of centralism and dictatorship in China. 
This suggests that legal localism will be a long-term goal for China. It is not 
impossible, however, and there have been positive signs for it. “Ruling the state by law” 
has been put forward, stressing the need oflegislation and law enforcement. The status 
oflaw will be elevated with these measures. The practice of the high-degree autonomy 
and democracy in the village committees that relate to some 900 million peasants, will 
have fundamental implication on central-local relations in China if the boundary ofthis 
practice is extended?^^ Another important institution conducive to legal localism, the 
welfare bureaucracy, is also emerging in China due largely to the need for the 
government, and local government in particular, to provide the new services of social 
233 Renmin ribao, 26 June 1998. 
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insurance.234 These reforms are conducive to the transformation oflegal localism. It 
was in the process to "establish units capable ofimplementing new public services" that 
Denmark and Norway redefined the responsibilities of governors and transformed their 
• 235 
central-local arrangement from political localism to legal localism. 
8.4 Directions for further studies 
The above discussion has revealed many potential topics for further studies. One 
is the opportunities in implementing central policies. Although by law local government 
must follow strict central policies, evidence has shown that local political elites may 
easily bypass or adapt them to local needs in implementation?^^ It will be interesting to 
know how much this increases the “localness，，of provinces, that is, enhances provincial 
autonomy. The process how and why the current pattern of central-local relations is 
formed is another topic worthy offurther studies. It will help us understand more about 
the background and nature ofthe central-local arrangement in China, and therefore 
better see what has been achieved and where the central-local relations are going. This 
study has focused on Guangdong, a province with many unique conditions, to provide a 
longitudinal perspective. Studies on other provinces will certainly help reveal more 
representative characteristics in the development of central-provincial relations, and a 
comparison between Guangdong and these provinces may further show what specific 
factors affect the development course and how. 
234 The Chinese government regards the establishment of social insurance as a prerequisite for further 
economic reform, especially the state enterprise. Among the nineteen major works the Guangdong 
government did in 1996, four are about social insurance. Guangdong Yearbook 1997, pp. 159-61. 
235 Edward C. Page, Localism and centralism in Europe: the political and legal bases oflocal self-
government, pp. 133-4. 
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The central-local relationship has disserved China for long, not only historically 
but also today. Now the rapid socio-economic changes in China provide opportunities 
to improve, or even transform, this critical relationship that has ‘‘long been a defining 
characteristic" ofChinese politics."^^^ With the effort of our politicians, legislators and 
scholars, it is hoped that a more stable, efficacious and institutionalized central-local 
relations will be achieved. 
236 Yang Xiaohui, Shengji zhengfu de zizhu xingwei: kaifang gaige shiqi de guangdong zhengfu 
{Autonomous behavior ofthe provincial government: Guangdong Government in the reform and open 
era), Chapters 4 and 5. 
237 David S.G. Goodman, "China in reform: the view from provinces." 
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Appendix 
I. A complete list of local legislation of Guangdong 
1979 . 
1. Regulation o f the Guangdong Provincial Government about dealing with illegal emigrants 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
1980 
2. Regulation of Guangdong Province for birth control 
3. Implementing details for the election of various levels of people's congresses in 
Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 8 August 1992) 
4. The regulation o f the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
(enacted by the NPC) 
1981 . 
5. Provisional regulation for administering people entering and exiting the SEZs in 
Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
6. Provisional regulation for company registration in the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
7. Provisional regulation for administering labor wage in the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 1 October 1988) 
8. Provisional regulation concerning land administration in Shenzhen SEZ 
(annulled on 3 January 1988) 
9. Provisional regulation of Guangdong Provincial Government against drug trafficking and 
drug usage 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
10. Provisional regulation of Guangdong Provincial Government against drug trafficking and 
drug usage 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
11. Provisional regulation concerning urban public health administration 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
1982 . 
12. Provisional regulation of Guangdong Provincial Government about the fine concerning 
gambling 
(annulled on 9 October 1991) 
13. Provisional regulation for price administration in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 1 December 1997) 
14. Provisional regulation for construction administration in the cities 
(annulled on 15 August 1992) 
15. Provisional regulation of Guangdong Provincial Government about banning salacious 
books, pictures and items 
(annulled on 1 July 1988) 
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1983 
16. Regulation for administering commercial housing in Shenzhen SEZ 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
17. Implementing details about the requisition of land for state construction in Guangdong 
Province 
(annulled on 1 Jan 1987) . 
18. Decision of the Guangdong PPCSC on amending the Implementing detailsfor the election 
ofvarious levels ofpeople's congresses in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on22 Aug 1992) 
1984 . . 
19. Regulation of Shenzhen SEZ concerning economic contracts involving foreign parties 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
20. Provisional regulation concerning technology importation of Shenzhen SEZ 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
21. Regulation of Guangdong Province for river and dyke administration 
22. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on passing the Implementing details ofGuangzhou 
Municipality concerning the requisition oflandfor state construction and house moving 
(annulled on 1 March 1995) 
1985 ， . 
23. Some regulations of Guangdong Province for protecting women and children s rights 
(annulled on 1 September 1994) . 
24. Regulation concerning trade unions in the companies in the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 1 October 1994) 
25. Provisional regulation concerning the procedure of enacting local laws by Guangdong 
PPCSC 
(annulled in 1993) . 
26. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the responsibility system for securing 
organs, associations, companies and institutions 
27. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on implementing article 25 of the Provisional regulation 
for price administration in Guangdong Province 
28. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
for administering economic contracts 
29. Provisional regulation for administering the exploitation of mineral resources in 
Guangdong Province 
30. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofShenzhen SEZfor 
administering lien loan 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
31. Regulation for administering the accountancy in companies involving foreign parties in 
the SEZs of Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
1986 , 
32. Regulation ofGuangdong Province concerning water and soil maintenance 
(annulled on 13 October 1993 
33. Decision ofGuangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulationfor administeringpeople 
travelling between Shenzhen SEZ and the inland 
34. Decision ofGuangdong PPCSC on amending some articles in the Regulation of 
Guangdong Province for birth control 
3 5. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the technological market 
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36. Implementing details concerning spreading nine-year free education 
37. Regulation concerning companies involving foreign parties in the SEZs in Guangdong 
Province 
(annulled on 1 August 1993) 
38. Regulation concerning the bankruptcy of the companies involving foreign parties in 
Shenzhen SEZ 
(annulled on 1 August 1993) 
39. Implementing details concerning land administration in Guangdong Province 
1987 , 
40. Implementing details concerning forest administration in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 1 July 1994) 
41. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning demolishing houses owned by overseas 
Chinese for state construction 
(annulled on 18May 1995) 
42. Regulation of Guangdong Province for dealing with beggars 
43. Regulation of Guangdong Province for prohibiting prostitution 
(annulled on31 May 1997) 
44. Some regulations concerning the lawyer's operation in Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 7 June 1995) 
45. Regulation concerning land administration in Shenzhen SEZ 
(annulled on 22 May 1991) 
46. Regulation ofGuangdong Province concerning the registration of social associations 
(annulled on 21 November 1991) 
47. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Economic 
and Technology Development Zone 
48. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
for protecting the source of drinking waterfrom pollution 
49. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Autonomous Regulation ofLiannan Yao 
Autonomous County of Guangdong Province 
1988 
50. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning labor security and health 
51. Operation procedure of the Guangdong PPCSC (tentative) 
52. Regulation of Guangdong Province for prohibiting salacious items 
(annulled on 31 may 1997) 
53. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning public assembly, march and demonstration 
(annulled on 9 May 1990) 
54. Labor regulation of the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
55. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending Article 14 of the Regulation ofGuangdong 
Province for river and dyke administration 
56. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
for administeringfood merchants and food industry managers 
(annulled on 22 September 1997 
57. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Autonomous regulation ofLiamhan 
Zhuang and Yao Autonomous County of Guangdong Province 
58. Decision ofGuangdong PPCSC on approving the Autonomous regulation ofRuyuan Yao 
Autonomous County of Guangdong Province 
1989 
59. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting adolescents 
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60. Operation procedure of the Guangdong PPC (tentative) 
61. Regulations concerning legal supervision by various levels ofPPCSC ofGuangdong 
Province (tentative) 
(annulled on 26 February 1994) 
62. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting citizen informants 
63. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting consumers' rights 
64. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
concerning employee education 
1990 
65. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning enlistment 
66. Regulation concerning lien loan in SEZs of Guangdong Province 
(annulled on 20 December 1992) 
67. Implementing details for fishing industry administration 
68. Implementing details oiPRC law ofassembly, march and demonstration in Guangdong 
Province 
69. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving Some regulations concerning assembly, 
march and demonstration in Guangzhou Municipality 
70. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
for administering the responsibility contract in the rural collective economies 
1991 
71. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting legal rights of the ages 
72. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting the water quality of the Dong River 
system 
73. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
for administering social and cultural markets 
74. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending Article 2 of the Implementing details 
concerning spreading nine-year free education 
75. Regulation concerning land administration in the SEZs in Guangdong Province 
76. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
concerning the comprehensive treatment for social security 
77. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending the Implementing details concerning land 
administration in Guangdong Province 
78. Regulation of Guangdong Province for prohibiting gambling 
79. Implementing details for the PRC water law in Guangdong Province 
80. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the administration fee 
1992 
81. Notice of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Implementing detailsfor PRC Water Law 
in Guangzhou Municipality 
82. Regulation for administering cooperative economic responsibility contracts in rural 
community in Guangdong Province 
83. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
concerning firework sales and usage 
84. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
against air pollution 
85. The regulation concerning the operation ofthe presidium of the people's congresses at the 
village and town level 
(annulled on 21 November 1995) 
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86. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
for prohibiting the production and sales of forged commodities 
87. Decision ofGuangdong PPCSC on implementing the Regulation ofGuangzhou 
Municipalityfor prohibiting the production andsales offorged commodities in the whole 
province 
88. Implementing details for the PRC city plan law in Guangdong Province 
89. Implementing details for the election for various levels of people's congresses 
90. Implementing details for protecting returning overseas Chinese and their families 
91. Regulation of Guangdong Province for statistics 
92. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending article 21 of the Regulation ofGuangdong 
Provincefor protecting the water quality of the Dong River system 
93. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on approving Some regulations ofGuangzhou 
Municipality for protecting wild animals 
94. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending the Regulation ofGuangdong Provincefor 
birth control 
95. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering lien loan 
96. Regulation for real estate administration in Zhuhai SEZ 
97. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipalityfor 
protecting the source ofdrinking water from pollution 
1993 
98. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning companies 
(annulled on 18 January 1997) 
99. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the bankruptcy of companies 
100. Regulation ofGuangdong Province concerning processing and assembly business for 
foreign parties 
101. Regulation of Zhanj iang Economic and Technology Development Zone 
102. Regulation of Guangdong Province for enacting local legislation 
103. Decision ofGuangdong PPC on approving the Regulation ofGuangzhou Municipality 
concerning schooling by social forces 
104. Regulation of Guangdong Province for prohibiting gambling 
105. Regulation of Guangdong Province for punishing loan sharks 
106. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting wild animals 
107. Regulation ofGuangdong Province concerning the continuings education for scientists 
and technologists 
108. Regulation of Ruyuan Yao Autonomous County of Guangdong Province concerning 
water resource administration 
109. Regulation of Guangdong Province for tender administration in construction projects 
]10. Implementing details of PRC law for water and soil maintenance in Guangdong Province 
111. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending Article 2 of the Regulation ofGuangdong 
Provincefor administering the administration fee 
112. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the protection zone o f b a s i c 
agricultural land 
113. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerningfavorable treatment for the enlisted volunteer soldiers and the settlement of 
retired soldiers 
114. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the administration of city environment and 
sanitation in the SEZs 
115. Regulation o fGuangdong Province for administering commercial electronic game 
rooms 
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116. Regulation of Guangdong Province for agent administration 
117. Regulation of Guangdong Province for telecommunication administration 
118. Regulation of Guangdong Province for properties development and operation 
119. Regulation of Guangdong Province for ensuring product quality 
120. Regulation concerning social insurance for employees in Zhuhai SEZ of 
Guangdong 
121. Regulation of Guangdong Province for higher education administration 
122. Regulation of Guangdong Province for punishing triad activities 
1994 
123. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning auction of properties 
(annulled on 18 January 1997) 
124. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the transaction of urban properties 
125. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering private enterprises of science 
and technology 
126. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting the labor right of enterprise 
employees 
127. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the settlement of the people free 
from prisons and labor education camp 
128. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering commercial recreational 
business 
129. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the supervision by people's 
congresses at various levels 
130. implementing details of the PRC law concerning the representatives ofthe NPC 
and local people's congresses at various levels 
131. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the lease of urban housing 
132. Regulation of Guangdong Province for forest protection 
133. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning road administration 
134. Decision of Guangdong PPC on amending article 12 of the Regulation of Guangdong 
Province forprotecting the labor right of enterprise employees 
135. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning urban properties registration 
136. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning property appraisal 
137. Regulation of Guangdong Province for fishing harbor administration 
138. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the environmental protection of 
construction projects 
139. Implementing details for PRC law forprotecting women 's rights in Guangdong 
Province 
140. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning foundation administration 
141. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
the protection of historical relic 
142. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning the exploitation ofmineral resources 
143. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
against environmental noise 
144. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the security administration of leaseholders 
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145. Implementing details for PRC law for the protection of the disables in Guangdong 
Province 
146. Implementing details for PRC trade union law in Guangdong Province 
147. Decision of Guangdong PPC on amending the Regulation of Guangdong Province 
concerning labor security and health 
148. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning enterprise security 
149. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipalityfor 
postal administration 
150. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of Regulation ofGuangzhou 
Municipality for administering economic contracts by Guangzhou Municipality People's 
Congress Standing Committee 
151. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning leasing urban properties owned by 
overseas Chinese 
152. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering book, magazine and newspaper 
markets 
153. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the compensation for the acquisition of 
collective land in rural area 
154. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning fishing administration 
155. Implementing details for PRC law concerning mine security 
156. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of Regulation of Guangzhou 
economic and technology development zone by Guangzhou Municipality People's 
Congress Standing Committee 
157. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
administering foreign-invested enterprises 
1995 
158. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning road transportation 
159. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning land administration 
160. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
stopping unusual discontinuation of schooling by students within the age period offree 
education 
161. Pawn Regulation of Guangdong Province 
162. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning collective business 
163. Implementing details for PRC law for spreading agricultural law in Guangdong Province 
164. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning demolition of urban housing owned by 
overseas Chinese 
165. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning lawyer licensing 
(annulled on 1 December 1997) 
166. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
preventing pollution from food industry in the Pearl River inside Guangzhou 
167. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Implementing details for PRC trade union 
law in Guangzhou Municipality 
168. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
preventing communicational diseases 
169. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Social security regulation ofGuangzhou 
Municipality 
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170. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning the usage and administration of farm chemicals 
171. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipalityfor 
administering the agricultural product market 
172. Regulation of Guangdong Province for road administration 
173. Regulation of Guangdong Province for handling disputes on land ownership 
174. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the promotion of science and technology 
175. Implementing details concerning the elections of people's congresses at various 
levels 
176. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of Regulation ofGuangzhou 
Municipality concerning firework sales and usage by Guangzhou Municipality People's 
Congress Standing Committee 
177. Regulation of Guangdong Province for preventing forest fire 
178. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the administration of the navigation lane 
179. Working Regulation for the chairperson and presidium of people's congresses at 
the village and town level in Guangdong Province 
180. Regulation of Guangdong Province on the appointment and dismiss of members of 
the standing committee of people's congress at various levels 
181. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning the examination of rural collective economies 
182. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
protecting Baiyun Shan resort 
183. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of the Regulation of 
Guangzhou Municipality for prohibiting the production and sales offorged commodities 
by Guangzhou Municipality People's Congress Standing Committee 
184. Decision of Guangdong PPC on the revocation of some Guangdong local laws 
promulgated before September 1995 
1996 
185. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the rural collective properties 
186. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering commercial performance 
187. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
protecting women 's rights 
188. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering economic contract 
189. Implementing details for PRC law against inappropriate competition 
190. Regulation for protecting drinking water source in Zhuhai Municipality 
191. Implementing details for PRC organic law for urban resident committees in 
Guangdong Province 
192. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning city environment and 
sanitation 
193. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for telecommunication administration 
194. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for administering commodity 
transportation on water channel 
195. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for the administration of vegetable bases 
196. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending article 33 of the Regulation of 
Guangdong Province for higher education administration 
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197. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of the Regulation of 
Guangzhou Municipality concerning employee education by Guangzhou Municipality 
People's Congress Standing Committee 
198. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipalityfor 
administering domestic dogs 
199. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the contracts of enterprise group 
200. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning animal quarantine 
201. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipalityfor 
the administration of medical emergency treatment 
202. Working Regulation for appraising cadres by standing committees of people's congresses 
at various levels 
203. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning labor supervision 
204. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the fine limit 
205. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending article 7 of the Regulation of 
Guangdong Province for administering book, magazine and newspaper markets 
206. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning patent protection 
207. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the burden of peasants 
208. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the administration of seeds of agricultural products 
209. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the quality administration of construction 
projects 
210. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending the Regulation of Guangdong Province 
for river and dyke administration 
211. Decision of Guangdong PPCSC on amending the Regulation of Guangdong Province 
for prohibiting gambling 
212. Working Regulation for the examination of law enforcement by standing committees of 
people's congresses at various levels in Guangdong Province 
213. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the amendment of the Regulation of 
Guangzhou Municipality concerning firework sales and usage by Guangzhou 
Municipality People's Congress Standing Committee 
214. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
city planning 
215. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Mun icipal ityfor 
greenery planting 
216. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for 
protecting agricultural environment 
217. Decision of Guangdong PPC on approving the Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
concerning the administration of children education 
1997 
218. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning surveying 
219. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning fuel gas 
220. Implementing details for the Law for protecting the investments of Taiwan people in 
Guangdong Province 
221. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning meteorological administration 
222. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the public projects funded by 
overseas Chinese 
223. Regulation of Guangdong Province for administering the executive law enforcing 
teams 
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224. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning the supervision of law enforcement 
in people's governments at various levels 
225. Regulation of Guangdong Province concerning property appraisal 
226. Implementing details of Guangdong Province for the PRC lawfor preventing 
environmental noise pollution 
227. Regulation of Guangdong Province for the administration of preventing incidents 
and emergency administration in public nuclear projects 
228. Regulation of Guangdong Province for protecting the rights of scattered minorities 
229. Decision of Guangdong PPC concerning the medical insurance and insurance for the ages 
in implementing the Regulation concerning social insurance for employees in Zhuhai 
SEZ of Guangdong by Zhuhai Municipality 
230. Working Regulation concerning the implementation of case supervision by 
standing committees of people's congresses at various levels in Guangdong 
Province 
231. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for administering municipal facilities 
232. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for statistics administration 
233. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning the demolition ofhouses 
234. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning environmental protection 
235. Construction Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality 
236. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for administering the river basin of 
Liuxihe 
237. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for administering social medical 
institutions 
238. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for administering the butchery industry 
and sales of the meat products 
239. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for protecting the rights of private 
enterprises 
240. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning the public housing fund 
241. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning the association of science and 
technology 
242. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for research fund administration 
243. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for labor contract administration 
244. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for preventing automobile gas pollution 
245. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for park administration 
246. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for protecting the water-keeping forest of 
Liuxihe 
247. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for protecting water conservancy facilities 
248. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality concerning religious affairs 
249. Regulation of Guangzhou Municipality for monitoring city management 
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II. Leaders of Guangdong Province, 1949-1998 
Before 1978 
Period The secretary 
Aug. 1949-Ju l . 1955 Ye Jianying 
Jul. 1955 - F e b . 1965 Tao Zhu 
Feb. 1965 - early Cultural Revolution period Zhao Ziyaiig 
Dec. 1970 - Mar. 1972 Liu Xingyuan 
Mar. 1972 - Dec. 1973 Ding Sheng 
Apr. 1974 - Oct. 1975 Zhao Ziyang 
Oct. 1975 - Nov. 1978 Wei Guoqing 
After 1978 
The Revolutionary Committee 
Period The secretary 
Nov. 1978-Nov. 1980 Xi Zhongxun (First Secretary) 
Yang Shangkun (Second secretary) 
The Party Committee The Government 
Period The secretary Period The governor 
Nov. 1980-Jul. 1985~~Ren Zhongyi Feb. 1981-Apr. 1983~~Liu Tianfu 
Apr. 1983-Aug.l985 Liang Lingguang 
Jul. 1985-Jan. 1991 Lin Ruo Aug. 1985-May 1991 Ye Xuanping 
Jan. 1991-Mar.l998 Xie Fei May 1991-Feb.l996 Zhu Senlin 
Feb. 1996 - now Lu Ruihua 
Feb.l998 - now Li Changchun  
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